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ABSTRACT
In almost three decades since the end of World War II,
the Japanese economy was on its upswing to realise what some
people called a miracle. From the 60s onward, lots of published
observations have been made by commentators in accounting for
the underlying factors that contributed, to the ecoriornic success
of the Japanese. The majority of the findings tended to praise
outright the Japanese managerial effectiveness, and to stress
the strength of the unique Japanese management style.
The aim of this study, then, lies on making an exploratory
case study towards the managerial patterns and practices of a
Japanese subsidiary factory here in Hong Kong. A Japanese owned
manufacturing subsidiary, known as Factory Y in this report, was
so chosen to make analysis on. The formal structure of the
factory was studied its management patterns and practices i%rere
explored and, the general performance of the organization as
well as the feedback from the Chinese production operatives
were detected.
Factory Y, though operated in an alien culture as in Hong
Kong, did attain quite a remarkable success. The organization
throughout the operational years saw an expansion in structure
and in size a steady growth in sales volume and in profit
return a relatively low rates of absenteeism and labor turnover
and, most of all, seemingly a satisfactory commitment from the
local employees.
All in all, Factory Y displayed an integrated system of
management strategies and techniques that reinforce one another
because of the management's orientation to the quality of human
resources. The case illustrated a management concern and prac-
tices based on the understanding that in return for the employees'
contribution to company growth and well being, the profitable
firm should provide a desirable and secure work environment as
well as.to protect the employees' welfare. In the process-of
doing so, the additional environmental variables of the host
country (i.e. I-long Kong) might exert influence on which of the
the practices would require more attention from the Japanese
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In almost three decades since the end of Second World War,
the Japanese economy was on its upswing to realise what some people
called a miracle.1 To describe Japan's growth performance as an
economic miracle may be a cliche, but it is hardly an exaggeration.
Today, Japan has come to dominate one selected industry after an-
other- eclipsing the British in motor-cycles, surpassing the
Americans and the Germans in automobile production, beating the
Germans and the Swiss in watches, cameras and optical instruments,
and overcoming the U.S.'s historical dominance in diversified
business as pianos, zippers, consumer electronics, and even in
heavy industries like steel and ship-building.2 In 1980, Japan's
GNP was the third highest in the world.3 And, if we extrapolate the
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current trends, it would be number one in the year 2000.
Moreover, in spite of Japan's smallness in size and virtually
lacking of natural resources, Japan has managed to sup-,ort its
115 million population and exports $75 billion worth more goods
than it imports, together with an investment rate as well as a GNP
growth rate twice than that of the U.S..5
All in all, the Japanese economic success has won the praise
and attention of other nations, particularly in the West.6 There
goes a world-wide phenomenon in searching, for the underlying
factors that account for the Japanese miracle.
21. The Clue of Japanese Success
What accounts for the Japanese success in industrial deve-
lopment? Gone are the days when Japan's achievement could be
explained by the litany of complaints- such as low wage base of
the Japanese workers or the effort of the Japanese government in
blocking all competing foreign products from entering its domestic
market that Western businessmen have been echoing in the early
1960s.7
The early 70s saw a bulk of analyses looking for easy ex-
planation in terms of Japanese culture.8 The secret of Japanese
success thus coated by a mysterious outlook. The argument runs that
cultural factors, such as the diligence of Japanese workers, their
enthusiastic attitude toward:, work, and their loyalty to the company
are responsible for the high proportion of workers who think for
themselves and strive to improve the methods used in their job. The
theory is further extended to explain the growth of Japanese economy.
In-this case, the Japanese success is derived solely from the d!s-
tinctive characteristics of Japanese culture that no other country
can possibly follow. Indeed, every nation has its own history and
cultural tradition and hardly one can say that the cultural fa.-tars
have no effect whatsoever. Yet these cultural tendencies may see
to explain why the Japanese should feel reasonably comfortable in
the institutions they have, they fail to tell how the Japanese
got their institution.9
The more contemporary era sees the clue of Japanese economic
success rooted in its superior management system.10 The Japanese
organizations are found to be more sophisticated. in utilizing social
3and spiritual forces for the benefits of the organization, an6 in
accepting the responsibilities to their employees that went with
a broad influence.11 It is commonly admitted that the merits of
the Japanese management in organizing and managing the human assets
have eventually led to such positive outcomes as reflected it in-
creasing productivity and fostering workers' commitment towards
work that shown in low rates of absenteeism and labor turnover. 12
Thus, this line of scholars ascribe the high productivity
achieved by the Japanese firms to the esoteric characteristics of
Japanese management. Among these, Ezra F. Vogel's Japan as Number
One: Lessons for America (1979) William G. Ouchi's Theory Z Ilow
American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge (1981); and
Richard T. Pascale & Anthony G. Athos's The Art of Japanese Management:
Applications for American Executives (1981) are perhaps the most
notable of this kind. They outraise that the Japanese management style
can be scientifically learnt. The Japanese management system may be
closely related to its cultural traditions, but hardly we can say
that it is completely determined. by such. Thus, the Japanese exper-
ience cL.n act as valuable reference for other countries (as reflected
in the subtitles of these three books) if we can ort out the funct-
ioning rationale behind the Japanese management system.
2. Challenge of the Japanese Management
Undoubtedly, organi-.ati,onal structure in present days' world
resemble.- a form first described by Max Weber (in Roth & Wittch, 19068)
as the 'bureaucratic institution'. Industrialization in the eighteenth
century fostered a great many large enterprises whose complex and
4and diverse activities made even more thoughtful organization riece-
scary. Weber's writing after this period described the ascend--incy
of the bureaucratic institution. To Weber, bureaucracy was not
simply a descriptive of the formal organization of modern era, but
as importantly bureaucratization was itself adescriptive of the
modernizing: process whereby all aspects of life were increas. gly
subsumed under the bureaucratic concern with rationality, predict-
ability, impersonality, and control. Since Weber's time, western
organization have maintained the bureaucratic form as their dis-
tinctive feature.
The term 'bureaucracy' since Weber has come to have pejorative
meaning. Not surprisingly, the view of 'labor' under the bureau-
cratic institution tended to divorce man as a social and spiritual
being from his productive role at work. One's spiritual and social
life now should clearly reside outside the work place to attain
efficiency.13 The work of scholars of the Humanistic Tradition
like Mayo (1947), Argyris (1964), McGregor (1960) and Likert (1967)
- all focused their attention on one ).inderizrin theme: how to
migitate the negative effect derived from this bureaucratic hierarchy
that nromote an iadiffernt working environment an restrict psycho-
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logical succe.s of the individual inside the organization. 14 Yet, it
seemed that all these humanistic scholars have failed to account
for why bureaucratic institution an inevitable response to industrial-
ization.
Based on their observation on the Japanese organization, Ouchi
and Price (1978) as ,sell as Pascale and Athos (1981) challenged this
common notion that bureaucratic in etilution as indispensable to
5modern industrial setting. They pinpointed this common fallacy of
the western organization theorists' inclination to believe the
regularities they have observed in the structure and in the management
of the western organizations are universal to modern industrial
setting.15 Another quite different form of organizational structure,
as derived from the Japanese organizational experience, the hierarchical
clan, or Type Z organization, also appears to succeed in such settings.16
The Japanese orgcinizations, though operate in a highly indust-
rialized setting, appear to have maintained many elements of the
'clan forms of control' 17 and rely far less on bureaucratic hierarchy
than western organization does, thus seemingly suffer also fewer of
its negative consequence. Thus the challenge of Japanese management
goes deeper than it is simply well-managed or emphasized human
relations; it also reminds the western organizational theorists to
rethink their own 'normal' organizational paradigm. It is under this
that the Japanese organization is at least interesting and i.:erha )s
provided a model for further organizational development.
The success of Japanese management in its national context
calls for a fresh and. growing interest to investigate into the
features and workin's of such a distinctive r_!amnagerial style.
Among this, the U.S. academics are more enthusiastic for they now
realise that Japan, once the most dutiful student of the U.S. manage-
ment practices, is now become the teacher. 18 Like pilgrims to the
temple of success, scholars and business practitioners all over the
world are travelling to Japan to study on the inner diligence of the
Japanese management system.
6The feverish demand of 'Learning from the Japanese' is riot
confineed to only the Wetstern wor1d, the South-East Asian countrie
as ,well as mainland China also utopping in. 19 Under the national
theme of 'Four Modernization', China has been vigorously involved in
learning the foreign management models and the Japanese one is one of
its main concern.. 20 Singapore, one of Hong Kong's toughest econmic
competitor in Asia, is also launching a nation-wide programme in
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learning the merits of the Japanese management system.
Back to the Hong Kong scene, the interest in the Japanese
success is still at its infancy stage. In spite of the intimate
relationships between Hong Kong and Japan in various aspect, few
studies had been made on the Japanese subjects in Hong Kong. 22
Surveys onto the operational conditions of the Japanese subsidiaries
in Hong Kong are sporadic, if not totally unknown. It is only
until quite recently that one distinctive Japanese minagerial tech-
nique in quality assurance, the quality control circles, becomes
more solemnly look at by the local entrepreneurs. 23 Those local
factories that have employed such an operational technique a'e
found to attain quite a remarkable Success, both in improving the
quality of the products a well as the workers' commitment towards
their work. Thus, it foresees a of attention towarc s the
m rits of Japanes? management as to lerrn their best and apply them
to the local eavirronment.
Indeed, it seems that one of the best way to Solve the puzzle
of whethe the Japanesse na iagemorit style can be sluccessfully applied
to a foreiga soil is by looking as how thoso japanese oversess
subsidiaries, if any, are working in tna partitular environment.
By studying how the Japanese investors utilize our own environment
and cultivate our own soil, it does provide us nob only a good
opportunity to ape the best of them but also a better understanding
towards our ownselves at the same time. The aim of this study, thus,
lies in making an exploratory study towards the managerial outlook
of a 'Japanese manufacturing subsidiary here in Hong Kong.
p. The Research Concern:The Managerial Patterns and Practices of a
Japanese Owned Factory in Hong Kong.
There have been a lot of studies concerning the management
patterns and characteristics of the Japanese business and industrial
organizations in Japan, yet very few have conducted outside Japan.
Here some paragraphs would be devoted to bring a quick review on
some of these studies.
Matt M. Amano (1979) made a case report via a longitudinal
study (from 193-1977) on a Japanese firm in the U.S. to see how the
Japanese managers go about in hiring and administering locally
recruited employees and how successfully they are. The company, identi-
i
fied as M-3 in the study, has found to develop a very unique organization
called the 'sandwich' structure in which the local personnel in middle
management were reporting to the top management and were assisted by
staff of dispatched personnel at the same time. The sandwich structure
organization is used by the company to break the cultural barrier
which existed between Japan and the U.S..
Richard Johnson (197) concludes that Japanese management is
not inherently superior to western management after researching some
twenty Japanese com nan ies in the U.S. and ma tchi.ng them with com-. -j- -i 1
parable U.S. firms in the same industries. Johnson further asserts
that the Japanese manager has no exceptional qualities, either in
bred or arising from his cultural heritage, that automatically
make him better in handling people and in managing resources.
Yet the studies of Roy Hill (1977) i Hatvany Pucik (1981),
%
and Tavernier (197) on the working of Japanese subsidiaries in the
U.S. and in the European countries draw a different conclusion.
These commentators found that many Japanese subsidiaries in their
studies are doing surprisingly successful in spite the fact that
they are operated in an alien culture. The techniques used by the
management of the Japanese subsidiaries to motivate the local employees
seem to play an important role in the effort to increase productivity.
Generally speaking, these studies show that the humanistic style of
Japanese management is expected to spread as Japan sharply steps
up its direct investment in other countries.
When referring back to the Asian continent, Ichimura (1980)
makes a comprehensive study onto the Japanese subsidiaries in five
Asian countries - Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. Concerning the application of such distinctive Japanese
management features such as lifetime employment, seniority wage and
bonus system, enterprise union, and 'ringi' decision making system
in these five countries as a whole, Ichimura found that only
the seniority wage and bonus system is practised by the Japanese
managers to the local employees in the respective host country to a
greater extent. The other three are mostly abandoned, if not making
partial amendment; to such practices to a certain extent.
All in all, the above mentioned studies sort to investigate
the outlook of Japanese subsidiaries overseas. Rather ambivalent
viewpoints are sometimes resulted among these studies. The regional
difference and the variation in research orientation makes these
studies incongruent . A bulk of them find that those Japanese
foreign settings carried with them a distinctive Japanese manage¬
ment favor - with great emphases on human relations management.
Yet, there also sees a modi f ica I: ion on amendment of the strategies
and techniques employed by those Japanese expatriates to suit the
local environment.
How do the Japanese subsidiaries work in Hong Kong? Ishikawa's
(1d8l) study onto seventeen Japanese firms in Hong Kong is perhaps
the most notable of this kind. The firms in Ishikawa's study
illustrate special concerns on human relations and on the quality
of the production. Nevertheless, Ishikawa's study is perhaps
quite superficial in the sense that only a very brief review on
those seventeen Japanese subsidiaries are made.
In line with Ishikawa's effort, this paper aims at a more j
thorough investigation on the Japanese subsidiary settings in Hong
Kong. The interest lies in seeing how the Japanese expatriates
keep u their so distinctive type o f rnanagemen t in running the i r
manufacturing establishments (since more local employees are presented
and the Japanese managerial patterns like quality control can be
better reflected in an industrial setting) in a host environment
- Hong Kong in this case. What are the constraints that those
Japanese managers possibly facing (i.e. relating bo the structural
characteristics of the Hong Kong environment) and what sort of
strategies and techniques they are employing in coping with such?
Attentions will pay on how these Japanese managers dealing with the
local employees as to motivate and to utilize the human resources of
the firm and what are the response of the local employees towards this?
Scarcity of existing information concerning the working of
Japanese factories in Hong Kong makes any attempted analysis onto
the subject a difficulty. Furthermore, shortage of time makes a more
comprehensive study into the operation of each and every Japanese
manufacturing subsidiary an impossible. Besides, a lacking of
commonly agreed viewpoint on the outlook of the Chinese management
2 if
style also impedes any possible comparison between the two.
In coping with the above-mentioned constraints, rather, an
indepth case study into one single Japanese manufacturing setting
in Hong Kong will be employed.
The limitations resulted from using only one case method as
lacking any generalization power or post hoc fallacy are well
2b
understood. Yet, the case study method also owns merits in acting
as the idea-getting investigation par excellance by providing a more
26
comprehensive understanding towards the unit under analysis. It
is important to recognise that this paper is basically informative
and exploratory in nature. Though only one case is employed in the study,
it is sometimes inevitable that certain generalised statements
might be made unconsciously. Where these should occur, it is felt
that informed speculation may still be preferrable to silence -
especially if it can provoke further investigations. It is sincerely
hoping that via such a study that we are on our very first step to
grasp a better understanding towards the working of Japanese
management in Hong Kong. It would be extremely pleased if this study
can provide any insight foe more investigations in the future.
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4.Guidelines of Study, Research Method & Data Collection
As mentioned in the preceding section, a case study method
will be employed in conducting this essay. A model is so con-
structed to aid a more systematic analysis on that particular
Japanese manufacturing subsidiary so chosen.
Fig I.1 The Managerial Patterns and Practices of a Japanese
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It is assumed that the Japanese managers brin alon with
them their distinctive management style when they first come to
Hon Kong and run their factory here. Facing the host onvironment,
the Japanese expatriates may need to moderate their inaa.nagerial
patterns and practices to a certain degree to cope with the local
situation. The overall performance of the firm is reflected in the
productivity increment, in the sales and profit growth, and in the
employees' attitude and commitment towards the firm.
A Japanese manufacturing subsidiary, known as Factory Y in
this study, is chosen after sorting out from the list of Japanese
manufacturing firms here in Hong Kong. The factory is specialized
in producing cameras and optical goods.
Through the generous assistance from the Consul of the Economic
Section of the Japanese Consulate General here in Hong Kong, a
formal introduction. to tho factory i f made possible. The factory
is selected for it suits two criteria which are thought to be quite
salient to the study.
(1) It is totally Japanese owned. Thud, the Japanese managers
presumably have greater power and autonomy in managing the
factory according to their own way. Under this circumstances,
more Japanese managerial characteristics are expected to reflect.
(2) The factory has quite a number of Japanese expatriates (altogether
13 Japanese staff) working in and thus the communication pattern
and the interpersonal relationships between the Japanese and
the local employees can be detected more easily.
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At the same time, the merit of Factory Y also lies in the
extremely kind assistance and cooperation offered by the Japanese
president, Mr. S, as well as from his fellow staff. The proximity
of the location of Factory Y (that situates in Kwun Tong area) also
makes frequent visits to the factory a great convenience.
Numerous field trips were made to the factory from December
1981 to April 1982. In the process of doing so, interviews were
conducted to the president as well as to some more senior staff of the
factory to ensure a better understanding towards the operational
strategies and practices of the management. A wale around the
factory was made to see how the production processes work. At the
same time, a valuable chance as to participate in the 'spring
feast'27 offered by the firm to its staff in early February, 1982,
was also attained.
On the other hand, since it was not possible to conduct any
indepth interviews to the production operatives without creating
any disturbance to the normal functioning of the work process, the
attitude of the workers towards the management was obtained from
returned questionnaires. A set of questionnaire (in Chinese) was
so constructed and distributed to the lo%ler grade production operatives
(i.e., the junior technicians and common workers which account for
85% of the employees in the factory) to measure their feelings
towards present employment in Factory Y. (See Appendix I for a
detailed description on how-the respondents of the study were drawn
and Appendix II for the content of the structured questionnaire)
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Furthermore, a couple of visits had been made to some oLher
Japanese subsidiary factories in Hons, Kong and talked to the
administration staff there so as to broaden the knowledge towards
the subject. Moreover, interviews were also conducted to some local
entrepreneurs and executives to see how they view Japanese management
and-the possibility of transferring it to Hong Kong.
5. Structure of the Stuff
Apart from this Introductory Chapter, Chapter II of this
report gives a brief review on the distinctive features of the
Japanese managerial style as proposed by various scholars in their
studies. Chapter III displays a general picture towards the patterns
and roles played by the foreign investment in Hong Kong with special
attention to the Japanese investment. Chapters IV, V, and VI
devote to the case study on Factory Y by presenting a profile of
the managerial patterns and practices as well as the response from
the local employees. Chapter VII offers discussion based on the
previous analyses and a brief conclusion will be fin ally made.
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CHAPTER II MANAGEMENT- JAPANESE STYLE
1. What is Management?
It is commonly agreed that our society is an organizational
ociety.1 At various time of our lives, each of us will be a member
of some kind of organizations. To quote from the sociologist Talcott
Parsons (1060:17), organizations are social units (or human groupings)
deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals.
At the same time, every organization requires methods for
making decisions, ways of communicating information and ideas, and
ways of evaluating the success of the organization in meeting its goals
and objectives.2 Thus, every organization requires management.
Management pertains to that most unpredictable phenomenon,
the human being. Like many areas of study that involve people,
management is difficult to define. One popular definition of management
is contributed by Mary Parker Follett (in Stoner, 1978:7):
'management is the art of getting thines done through people.'
This definition calls attention to the fact that leaders or managers
achieve their goals by managing for others to perform whatever tasks
may be necessary, not by performing the tasks themselves.
James A. F. Stoner (1973:8) furthers the definition by saying that
'management is the process of planning, organizing, leading,
and controlling the efforts of organizational members and
the use of other organizational resources in order to
achieve stated organizational goals.'
Undoubtedly, most managers in the business organization will
probably agreed. that management's key concern is the optimal
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utilization of a firm's various assets. These assets may vary-
financial, technological, human, and so on. Tradeoffs are neccesary
for utilization of any one asset may perhaps result in under-
utilization of another.
It is generally admitted that in most Japanese firms and
business organizations, human assets are considered to be the
firm's most important and profitable assets in the long run.3
Thus the focus of this paper is not on such area as corporate
market or production strategies in management. Rather, the mana-
gement practices in Japan as they affect one key company asset:
human resources, will be examined.
The Japanese management style is highly praised by its
western parts. The organizational pattern, however, has been deve-
loped in a socio-cultural environment which features a number of
unique Japanese characteristics. The wide variety of forms and
practices that Japanese personnel management has adopted, for
example, reveals a number of co:... imon place characteristics to the
non-Japanese observer, but at the same time may startle him with
the number of singularly Japanese features. Thus, some understanding
and insight into what makes the Japanese Japanese and into their
socio-cultural environment is quite essential in any critical
analysis of Japan. It is certainly indispensable for a balanced
view of Japanese personnel management practices.
The following section describes the special feature of the
Japanese in their group formation which is so distinctively
reflected in their economic organizations.
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2. The Japanese Idea of Group Formation
If the task of pointing out the main difference between
Japan and western societies is raised, no doubt that the large
majority of experts would somehow come up with a reference to the
importance of the group in Japan, as compared with greater emphasis
on the individual in the West.4 As reflected in the organizational
field, the Japanese business firm is notable for its familial out-
look and its corporate groupism.5
Concerning to this group-oriented behaviour of the Japanese,
Takeo Doi (1973:54) puts it this ways:
'generally speaking, the Japanese like group action.
It is extremely difficult for a Japanese to transcend
the group and act independently. The reason would seem
to be that a Japanese feels vaguely that it is treach=erous
to act on his own without considering the group to which
he belongs, and feels ashamed, even, at doing something
on his own.'
Takeo Doi refers to the concept of 'aurae' as essential for an
understanding of Japanese psychology. This' anae' refers to a
deeply felt need of the Japanese to 'be treated warmly', to 'be
cuddled', to be included in a sympathetic and understanding envir-
onmet ; an urge to be enwrapped in the protection of a certain
group (or relevant individual) from which security, -oredictability
and warmth can be gained.
In line with Doi's argument, Takie Sugiyama Lebra (1876:105)
furthers the idea of groupism among the Japanese:
'the individual Japanese are extremely sensitive to and
concerned about social interaction and relationship ....
the individual Japanese is not a self-sufficient, auto¬
nomous whole but a fraction consisting a part of the whole.
Belongingness is a neccessary basis for establishing
identity. The unit of action, then, is the group rather
than the individual.'
Group-orientedness, undoubtedly, is one of the main char¬
acteristics of Japanese society. Shortly speaking, it may be des¬
cribed as an inclination among Japanese individuals to attach
great value to being a member of one important group, to more or
less neglect individual interests if those of the group are felt
to be at stake, and to heavily rely on the group for satisfaction
of one's most important needs. Contrastingly, western societies
6
are thought to foster more individualistic tendencies. The
westerners, even though being a member of a range of groups, will
be inclined to give preferences to his private interests over those
of any of those groups, and to be more independent and self-suff¬
icient when it comes to personal development and need satisfaction.
In studying the Japanese idea of group formation, Chie Nakane
(1970:25) stresses the importance of vertical relations, notably
a strong emotional attachment between a superior (oyabun) and a
subordinate (kobun), exceeding in relevance any ties existing
between group members of comparable level. Nakane (1970:19) goes
on to say that:
'the characteristics of Japanese enterprise as a social
group are, first, that the group is itself family-like
and, second, that it prevades even the private lives of
its employees for each family joins extensively in the
enterprise.'
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To put the theories of Doi and. Nakano together: Japanese
people tend to satisfy their 'amae' need through strong personal
ties with superiors (or subordinates) rather than with immediate
peers. This means, that on one hand a Japanese must be a member
of a relevant group (e.g. a company, or one of its constituent
units), but that most satisfaction is to be derived from vertical
relations within this group.
Concern for belongingness urges the individual to contribute
to the group's goal at the expense of his personal interest. But
then, if the interest of goal of the group overrides individual
interest, it also overrides the interests of other groups unless
a coalition is formed. Thus, company employees are aware of the
keen competition between companies and try to ensure that their
own companies win over other companies.? Group egoism, then, is
a very common phenomenon in Japanese society. The inclination on
the part of Japanese individuals to long for membership of a viable
group, together with the tendency of Japanese groups to guard
exclusively their members' interests are reflected in the consp-
icious features of Japanese personnel management.
3. Japanese Management: Some Features
To seek for a better understanding towards the uniqueness
of the Japanese organizational pattern, scholars on this subject
tend to laying out a Japanese organizational model that describes
the distinctiveness of the type. At the same time, the western
organizational model which is often taken as a system closely
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resembles the bureaucratic form, is frequently employed to contrast
and compare with the Japanese one.
Ronald Dore (1973) contrasts the organizational features
of the Japanese factory to the British one. Dore referred the
British one as a market-oriented type which is unitary and with
a single national system in which all firms operate in the same
labor market. The Japanese is conceived as organization-oriented
type which is dualistic with a market-oriented system in the small
firms and an organization-oriented system in the large firms.8
Thus, the really distinctive features of Japanese business org-
anizations as contrasted from the western counterparts are actually
those characteristic,:, prevailing in the large enterprise only.
To Dore, the Japanese organization-oriented system shows
to have those features like lifetime employment, a seniority-plus-
merit wage system, an intra-enterprise career system, enterprise
training, enterprise union, a high level of enterprise welfare.
The British market-oriented type, on the other hand, experienced
considerable mobility of employment, a market-based wage and
salary system, self-designed mobile rather than regulated careers,
publicly provided training, industrial or craft unions, more state
welfare and a greater strength of professional, craft, regional
or class consciousness.9
Moreover, Charles Y. Yang (in Fukuda, 1979:9) compares the Japanese
and American management by classifying them according to the significant
differences in top management. Yang refers the U. S. as the
'system type' and -those of Japan as 'organic type'. The system
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type of management, Yang states, places emphasis on the planning
mode of decision-making and focuses on systemic analysis where
the analyst plays a major role in decision making. The organic
type places emphasis on the adaptive mode of decision making, and
it is characterised by reactive solution to existing problems
rather than the active search for new opportunities. Thus the
top management in the Japanese organization acts as facilitator
rather than decision maker as in the U. S. type.
William Ouchi (1981:57) further finds that the Japanese
model is the opposite of the American organizational model in
nearly every important respect.




Slow evaluation and promotionRapid evaluation and promotion
Non-specialised career pathsSpecialised career paths
Implicit control mechanismsExplicit control mechanisms
Collective decision makingIndividual decision making
Collective responsibilityIndividual responsibilit -
Wholistic concernSegmentedlconcern
Source: Adapted from William Ouchi, Theory Z, p.58.
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Generally speaking, employment is typically short in American
companies with an annual turnover of fifty to ninty percent in
some years in the manufacturing and clerical occupation not
uncommon. 10 Whilst in Japanese organization, the employees' turnover
11
is several times lower. In some cases, resignation and lay offs
are virtually unknown among large Japanese enterprise.
Lifetime employment is one of the predominant feature inside
a Japanese company. It involves a total commitment on the part
of the worker to the employer for his entire working life. 12
In return, the employer is comrnited to look after all the interests
of his employees. 13 The lifetime employment systems stem from the
tacit understanding between labor and management that an employee,
once he joins company, will stay until retirement age. The
management provides a complete job and earning security to employees1
in return for an occupation commitment.
Rapid employees turnover in the western countries necessitates
speedy evaluation and promotion. Employees will become impatient
in a company slow to evaluate and promote. On the other hand, a
twin product of the Japanese lifetime employment practices comes
the Japanese organizations' slow evaluation and promotion towards
their staff as reflected in the seniority based wage and promotion
system. Although there are pay differentials later in the career
based on performance and responsibility, these are small when
14
compared to those accounted for by seniority pay.
The very slowness of this evaluation and promotion process
26
discourages the playing of certain kinds of short-term corporate
games, although it does not entirely rule out such behavior. The
employees now has no reason to advance his career at someone else's
expense. The employees in the Japanese corporation understand
that, everyone unfairly treated will still be at the bank, due
to the lifetime employment policy. While this process at times
seems painfully slow to aspiring young employees in Japanese firms,
it promotes a very open attitude towards cooperation, performance,
and evaluation, since the system makes it highly likely that true
performance will indeed come out in the wash.15
Another important feature of Japanese organization is their
development of individual careers. It is common for the employees
in the western countries conducting their careers between organ-
izations but within a single specialty. Whilst in Japan, people
conduct careers between specialties but within a single organization.
The process of lifelong job-rotation holds true for employees
in many Japanese firms. As employees rotate semilaterally from
job to job, they become increasingly socialized into the organization,
immersed in the company philosophy and culture, and bound to a
set of shared goals. Generally speaking, the Japanese emphasis
on slow promotion and job rotation creates an environment in
which an employee becomes a generalist rather than a specialist
in a particular functional area.
In additions, the basic mechanism of control in a Japanese
company is embodied in a philosophy of management. On the other
hand, the major American company and government bureau devotes
a large fraction of its time to the setting of specific, measuring
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performance targets. 16 The company philosophy of the Japanese
firm is an implicit theory of the firm, describes the objectives
and procedures to move towards them. These objectives take into
the consideration of the owners, employees, customers, community
at large, and so on, as well. Thus, for those who grasp the
essence of this philosophy of values and beliefs can generate
almost an unlimited number of special rules or targets from those
general statements to suit the changing condition. Under this
overarching management philosophy, specific rules or targets made
would be consistent among individuals. Thus the philosophy provides
both control over the ways people respond to problems and coor-
dination between them, enhance solutions merging with one another.
The company's unique management philosophy, implicit rather than
explicit, is communicated through common culture and shared by
key management level and, to certain extent, all employees of
that particular firm. 17
At the same time, it is common in the typical American
organization that the department head, division managers, and the
president take the responsibility of making decisions. Whilst the
Japanese organizations are notable for their participative approach
to decision making. When the subject of decision making comes up
with Japanese executives, the term 'ringi seido', or ringi system,
is invariably mentioned. 18 Upon-closer inquiry, it becomes evident
that the ringi system is much more than just a procedure it repre-
sents a basic philosophy of management deeply rooted in Japanese
tradition. The value of cooperation is expressed through the ritual
of ringi, a collective decision making in which a document passes
28
from manager to manager for their official seal of approval.
Slowly individual preferences give way to collective consensus.
Undoubtedly, making a decision this way takes a long time, but
once a decision is reached, everyone affiliated by it will be
likely to support it.
In line with the emphasis of collective effort in making
decision i.ithin Japanese corporations, responsibility for decisions
is intentional ambiguity.19 Collective responsibility and collective
decision making among the Japanese corporate men reflects the strong
orientation to collective values of the Japanese people. Japanese
organization devote far greater attention to structural factors
that enhance group motivation and cooperation than to the motivation
of individual employees. Tasks are usually assigned to groups,
not to individual employees, and group cohesion is stimulated
by delegating responsibility to group not only for getting the
task performed, but also for designing the way in which they get
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performed. Merits of collective responsibility causes people to
work well together and to encourage one another to better efforts.
Yet to the critics of it, collectivism seems to restrict the kind
of maverick creativity and hinders the individual incentive
to viards work.
Most western organizations practice an attitude of 'partial
inclusion', an understanding between employer and employee that
the association between them involve only those activities dir-
ectly connected with the completion of a specific job. The Japanese
organization, by cantrast, forms inslesive relationship.21 Rathcr
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than a connection through a single work relationship, individuals
interconnect through multiple bonds (e.g. in company organized
activities, encouragement of seniors to concern for their juniors
and so on). When economic and social life are integrated into a
single whole, the relationship between individuals become intimate.
Values and beliefs become mutually compatible over a wide range
of work and. non-work related issues. Thus through multiple bonds
in a wholistic relationship, intimacy, trust and understanding
between individual grows.
On the other hand, based on their studies on the Japanese
subsidiaries in U.S., Hatvany and Pucik (1981) proposed a model
of Japanese management system that rests on a few elements that
can be examined in different cultural settings. Hatvany and Pucik
conceived that human resources are considered to be the firm's
most important and profitable assets in most Japanese companies.
At the same time, it is important to recognise that this manage-
ment orientation is in fact backed up by a well---integrated system of
strategies and techniques that translate this abstract concept
into reality.
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I Concern for the employee
Source: Adapted from Hatvany & Pucik in Organizational Dynamics
(Spring, 81):9.
As the human assets is highly valued and cheri.shed in most
of the Japanese firms, once management adopts the view that utilizing
human assets is what matters most in the organization's success,
several strategies have to be pursued to secure these assets in
the desired quality and quantity.
Firstly, a company philosophy is articulated that shows
concern for employees' needs and stresses cooperation and team
work in an unique environment.
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Secondly, long-term and secure employment is provided,
which attracts employees of the desired quality and induces them
to remain in the firm.
Furthermore, close attention is given both to integrating
employees into the company at all stage of their work life.
These general strategies are then expressed in*specific mana-
gement techniques. Emphasis is placed on continuous development
of emploee'skills. Formal promotion is of secondary importance,
at least during the early career stages. Employees are evaluated
on a multitude of criteria- often including group performance
results- rather than on individual bottom-line contribution. The
work is structured in such a way that it may be carried out by
groups operating with a great deal of autonomy. Open communication
is encouraged, supported, and rewarded. Information about pending
decision is circulated to all concerned before the decisions are
actually made. Active observable concern for each and every employee
is expressed by supervisory personnel. Generally speaking, each
of these management practices, either alone or in combination with
the others, is known to have a positive influence in commitment
to the organization and its effectiveness.
All in all, the operation of many Japanese firms displayed
an integrated system of management strategies and techniques that
r
reinforce one another because of systematic management orientation to
I
the quality of human resources.
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4. Concludin Remarks
In the above sections, some distinctive features of the
Japanese culture and its organizational characteristics were examined.
Generally speaking, Japanese management, which is regarded as
human centered, values highly the spirit of harmony for goal ach-
ievement and desires trouble-free human relationships. It is thought
that in Japanese business, in which there is a strong sense of
unity within the organization and high individual morality, that
maintaining human relations in order to let the individual exhibit
his full ability rather than controlling him rigidly for the sake
of raising efficiency, will eventually promote the improvement of
efficiency. Moreover, in Japanese business, it is almost unthink-
able to assign each individual aims, duties, responsibilities, or
authority. Accordingly, responsibility is rarely assigned to indi-
viduals. There is rather a collective responsibility system by
department unit, or a non-responsibility system.
In the process, the western organizational model as such
was frequently er ployed to compare and contrast with the Japanese
one in various aspects. It is holing that through this effort a
better understanding towards the latter can be enhanced. Undoubtedly,
the analyses as such usually end up with two abstractions from
reality, each c.escribinr some set of underlying tendencies which
capture the not-always-realized essense of format. Needless to
say, those classifications neces:_:arily have the drawback of over-
simplification. The reality always have these features displayed
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in varying degrees. Thus, no one organivation or single individual
will contain each and every characteristics mentioned in pure form.
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CrIAAPTLR III FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN HONG KONG
1. The Setting- Hong Kong: an 0pen Economy
Hong Kong, a small British colony that accommodates over
1
five,million people, is almost entirely lacking in natural resources.
The basic features of the Hong Kong economy are quite clear
however- rapid and sustained growth based upon the export of
manufactures, with minimum of government intervention or planning
that aids a laissez-faire type economy. 2
The local manufacturing sector is predominantly character-
ised by small firms operating in a highly competitive product
market, export-oriented and subject to fluctuations.3 Approxi-
mately ninety percent of Hong Kong's manufactured goods are
exported, and the overwhelming bulk of its foodstuffs and consumer
goods are imported. It has little control over restrictions
or quotas that other nations may implement against its goods,
nor over embargoes that may restrict both importing and export-
ing. Thus when fashions change, external restriction increases
and competition becomes more severe, the firms then go into
liquidation, job disappears, and whole industries go into decline.
The fact of Hong Kong's externally dependent economy, due to
its almost complete resourcelessness, encourages a handsoff
attitude by government towards the private sector.4 To Lin
and Mok (1981:29), laissez-faire was just a way of letting things
run their natural course,
Critics characterise Hong Kong's economy as one of 'boom
and bust' type. The competitive pressure in such an open
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economy encourages the taking of high profits and gets things
done in a hurry whenever possible: a disposition of the Hong
Kong businessman which is further encouraged by a desire to
make as much money as possible in case China takes over.
Richard Hughes (1968) proposed the idea that Hong Kong is a
borrowed place living on borrowed time infuses all economic
activity with an urgency of no tomorrow, Hong Kong is thus a
place to make a living, but not a home.
At the same time, the local labor market is also character-
ised by a high degree of instability-- as reflected in a high
degree of labor turnover in the manufacturing sector. For
instance, some commentators have reported that an annual rate
of turnover as high as between 50•% and 100% among many firms
in the local electronics and textile industries are not uncommon.6
Hong Kong does not impose a statutory minimum wage, thus earnings
of industrial workers fluctuate with overall economic activity.
The majority of workers that possessing transferable skills
and operating in a tight labor market gives them the freedom to
move if they wish.? Historically, conditions of expanding demand
for unskilled workers and machine operatives encouraged workers
to believe that by moving to another firm for more money or
continued employment they would be better off. Loyalties to
firm are then less important than salary and fringe benefits,
and thus workers respond quickly'and rationally to alternative
market opportunities.8
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2. Foreign Investment: An overall view
A fundamental problem in the study of foreign investment in
Hong Kong is the definition of what is 'foreign'? 9 At the same
time, under Hong Kong's laissez-faire policy, there is little
from-which we can trace the source of capital.
The Commerce and Industry Department (which has recently
become the Trade, Industry and Customs Department, or TICD) has
conducted an annual survey on the overseas manufacturing establish-
ments in Hong Kong since the early 1970s. Furthermore, the 1973
and 1978 industrial census also provides some valuable informat-
ion on these establishments. Undoubtedly, this is far from
giving a comprehensive picture of foreign investments in Hong
Kong for it neglects the overseas investment in the financial
and service sectors which constitute part and parcel of Hong Kong's
overall economic development. Yet from those above mentioned
sources that we can obtain some quantitative information to
piece together a picture on the development patterns, the role
as well as contributions of these overseas establishments in the
manufacturing sector in Hong Kong.
Concerning the relationship with the foreign investors at
the initial stage of industrialization, Hong Kong contrasts from
other late developing countries in two ways. 10 In the first
place, there is the complete absence of foreign aid and secondly,
private foreign investments in the manufacturing field is relati-
vely not so important. Industrialization was known to be init-
iated primarily by the effort of local entrepreneurs. Private
foreign investments generally concentrated in the financial and
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trading sectors rather than in the manufacturing sector in Hong
Kong in the 1950s. It was only until the 1960s when Hong Kong
had become a profitable exporter of labor intensive manufactures
that an increasing number of overseas investors began to pour
in. 11 This time, the foreign firms, especially American, but
Japanese and others as well, made massive investments in Hong
Kong. They set up their own factories, imported the latest equip-
ment, brought in the most refined techniques, and recruited the
relatively cheap yet good quality local personnel. They first
saw Hong Kong an ideal off-shore manufacturing location for
labor intensive products such as electronics and toys. Later
they also found Hong Kong with substantial markets for inter-
mediate products such as textile and chemicals and final products
such as printed material and food.
Generally speaking, the interests of the overseas investors
in Hong Kong were many and they were attracted to Hong Kong by
its favourable investment climate. Some surveys indicated that
Hong Kong's most attractive factors include its laissez-faire and
non-discriminatory policy, in addition to this the low tax rates,
free foreign exchange and easy capital fund raising, excellent
supporting facilities, relatively cheap and high quality labor
as well as good labor relations. 12
To further exploring the activities of foreign investors
in Hong Kong, Table III.1 displays the condition of overseas
investments in local manufacturing sector up to 1974.





















Source : Overseas Investments in Hong Kong Manufacturing
Industries: Industrial Survey Deport, Commerce
and Industry Department, Hong Kong, August 1975-
Early back to i960, there were only 27 such kind of over¬
seas firms in Hong Kong's manufacturing sector and accounted for
about 0.6% of all manufacturing establishments in Hong Kong. The
number of overseas establishments experienced a steady growth
since then to 236 firms in 197- From 1970 onward, the number
of overseas investments had stabilized to 1% of all manufacturing
establishments in Hong Kong. In terms of capital investment,
the amount had quadrupled within 10 years from i960.
Somewhat more detailed information can be obtained towards
the overseas investment in the manufacturing sector during the
1970s. Overseas investment figures are then given by country
and by industry.
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As a source of overseas investment, U.S.A. leads all other
countries. It can be shown in Table 111.2 that the U.S. 's share
had been decreasing from well over 50% at the early 70s to some-
what around 40% in 1980, yet still leads. Japan ranks second
and has maintained its share throughout the 70s at around 20%
(except in 1974 when Japan was greatly affected by the Oil Crisis).
The British investors keep a third place but also experienced a
decrease in share. In 1980, the three largest overseas investors,
namely the U.S., Japan, and U.K., accounted for more than 70%
of total foreign investment in Hong Kong.
Table ITI.3 indicates the number of manufacturing establish-
ments from various countries and their share in total. Generally
speaking, it shows quite a similar pattern as the amount of in-
vestment. It is note-worthy that the number of U.S. settings
and Japanese establishments is far exceeding their other overseas
competitors in Hong Kong.
Table 111.4 displays the distribution of overseas investments
in various industries. The U.S. investments dominated the elect-
ronics, chemicals, and electrical product industries in that its
investment share constituted some what two-thirds of all overseas
investments. The Japanese investors occupied an important
position in the textile and in the printing publishing field.
The British competitor spread out in a variety of industries
and the Swiss investors concentrated on printing publishing,
and food industries.
Table III.2: Distribution by Source of Overseas Investments in
Hong Kong's Manufacturing Sector, Excluding Local
Interest (in million Hong Kong dollars at end of
year )



























































































































































Source: Trade, Industry Customs Department, Hong Kong.
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total.
Table III.3: Distribution by Source of Overseas Firms in Hong
Kong's Manufacturing Sector (in number of firms)
















































































































































312 367 921 963 302
Source: Trade, Industry Customs Department, Hong Kong.
Note: Some firms have several investors. Therefore total
numbers here are larger than elsewhere reported.
Table Ill.k: Sources and Distribution of Overseas Investments
in Hong Kong 1978, Excluding Local Interest






















































































U.S. Japan U.K. land Others Total
Source: Trade, Industry Customs Department, Hong Kong.
Indeed, the role that a multinational corporation pjays in
a host country varies according to the types of business that
13
has been found to be promising in a particular country.
Undoubtedly, the activities of these corporations have impacts
on economic, social and technological aspects to both parties
19
concerned. It can also been seen that there are both advantages
and disadvantages to both the undertaking side and the hosting
side of foreign ventures.
Being foreign, these overseas establishments in the local
manufacturing sector naturally had their own distincitive features
in the process. To further investigate into the role of overseas
establishments and oring out their characteristics, a comparison
between the overseas establishments and their local counterparts
of similar size is shown in Table III.5
Table III.3: Comparison of Overseas and All Manufacturing
Establishments in Hong Kong with 20 or more












































Source: 1973 Census of Industrial production and additional
information for 1978,Census Statistics Department,
Hong Kong.
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From Table 111.5, it is quite obvious that the average size
of the overseas establishments was by far larger that the overall
average. On the other hand, the small difference in labor cost
per person indicates that both local and overseas establishments
drawing their work force from the same labor market which was
highly competitive in Hong Kong. Furthermore, overseas establish-
ments were more capital intensive and their output per person
was higher and resulting in a lower labor cost per output and
thus more efficient than their local counterparts.
On the other hand, overseas establishments also help to
provide working opportunities to the local population. A recent
announcement by the Trade, Industry and Customs Department that
the overseas manufacturing settings upbringing an employment
figure of 900,059 in 1981 which occupied a 10% share of total
working population in that sector.15
Relatively little is known about the export of overseas
firms in Hong Kong. The Trade, Industry and Customs Department
estimated a total sale of HK$17 billion by the foreign interest
in the manufacturing sector. 16 Amongst this, about 67% of the
production sale was obtained from the overseas markets. Compar-
ing to Hong Kong's trade statistics, it represented as share of
16.4/ of Hong Kong's total domestic exports in 1981.
Shortly speaking, the overseas investment participated in
Hong Kong's overall economic development. Owing to the lack of
a comprehensive picture towards the overseas investment here,
comments on their contribution are limited only to their efforts
in the local manufacturing sector. In the process, they had
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brought in new -industries and technology in addiction to joining
old ones. Their contribution in providing employment opportunities
to the local work force should not be underlooked. Being foreign,
these firms naturally had their distinctive characteristics
but in an economy of laissez-faire, they work side by side with
local firms in a similar manner-- competing for the same labor
force, processing largely imported inaterials and producing mainly
for export markets, and constituted an integral part of the
manufacturing sector in Hong Kong.
3. The Japanese Investment
Of the general observations one can make about the profile
of Japanese investment abroad, two characteristics are worth
noting. 17 Firstly, about 40 percent of the total investments
are of so-called natural resource-or_ iented`` types, while the
remaining o0 percent are of the 'lmarket-oriented', types. The
latter are designed either for deeper penetration of overseas
markets for manufactured goods or for such on-site services as
banking and construction to accommodate Japanese ventures abroad.
Secondly, of manufacturing subsidiaries abroad, about 80 percent
are concentrated in developing countries in Asia and Latin
America, where technological and income levels are still remained
lower than those of Japan.
The advance of Japan's industry into neighboring Asian
countries has been phenomenal. 18 Indeed, considering that bitter
memories of Japan's past military occupation and colonialism
bred animosities against the Japanese throughout Asia immediately
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after the Second World War. It is extremely remarkable that
during the 1960s Japan's private investments were so willingly
accepted by other Asian countries. By the early 1970s, Japan
has re-emerged as the leading investor throughout Asia. 19
Information concerning the Japanese investors in the local
manufacturing sector had been partially displayed together with
its various other counterparts in the last section. Tracing
back to the 50s, Japanese investments in Hong Kong were initially
concentrated in the commercial and trading sectors. It was only
after mid-60s that Japanese investors began to set up their
manufacturing shops in Hong Kong, mostly in synthetic and woolen
textiles, electronics, electrical products, printing and publi-
cation, and other relatively skill-requiring, but small scale
industries.
From a recent survey conducted by the Hong Kong Japanese
Chamber of Commerce in 1981 that a more detailed picture concern-
ing the overall distribution of Japanese-firms in the local
economic sector is obtained, The findings are presented in
Table 111.6 and Table III.7. The total number of Japanese
establishments in Hong Kong goes to a figure high as 773. Yet it
should note that the figure only shows a total number of locat-
ional settings, not necessarily the number of different Japanese
corporations summed up together.
Another study putting forth by the Toyo Keizai Shinposha
on the operation conditions of Japanese multinationals abroad
did have devoted some pages on Hong Kong. Table 111.8 and
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Table 111.6: Distribution of Japanese Firms in Honk Konpp's
Commercial and Trading Sector, 1981















4Department Stores (Representative Office)
1Warehouse





Source: Survey by the Hong Kong Japanese Chamber of Commerce on
May 25th, 1981.
Note: The figures indicate only the number of different set-
tings, not the actual number of distinctive Japanese
corporations.
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Table III.7: Distribution of Japanese Firms in Hong Kong's
Manufacturing Sector, 1981.




26Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery
Precision Machines 37
48Electrical Appliances








Printing and Publishing 7
25Others
Total 347
Source: Survey by the Hong Kong Japanese Chamber of Commerce
on May 25th, 1981.
Note: The figures exclude those with other overseas or local
interests.
The figures only indicate the number of different settings,
not necessary the actual number of distinctive Japanese
corporations.
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Table 111.8: Japanese Investment in Hong Kong-
Major Investment Aims
(in number of preference counts)
Investment Aims
12Guarantee of Resources Raw Materials
63Utilization of Labor Force/
Reduction in Labor Cost
Benefits under the Local Government's 9
Protection Policy
207Expansion of Local and other Overseas
Markets
105Information Collection
Source: Japanese Multinationals: Facts and Figures,
a survey by Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1982, p.16
Note: 1. Answers were obtained on June '30th, 1981.
2. Total counts do not corresponse to the
total number of enterprises for each
respondent could choose more than one answer.
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Table III.9: Japanese Investment in Hong Kong-
Major Sources where Production Material
Obtained and, Major Production Markets
(by country and in number of preference
counts)








Source: Japanese Multinationals: Facts and Figures,
a survey by Togo Keizai Shinposha, 1982, p.16.
Note: 1. Answers were obtained on June 30th, 1981.
2. Total counts do not corresponse to the
total number of enterprises for each
respondent could choose more than one item.
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'fable 111.9 illustrate the major investment aims, sources where
production material obtain as well as the major markets for
production.
Concerning the investment aims, the intention of expanding
the share in local as well as other overseas markets is most
obvious. Hong Kong, with its position as an international
financial centre and a city where East meets West, serves as an
excellent information collecting centre for the Japanese investor:
Utilization of local labor force occupies lesser strategic
position. Unlike its other Asian counterparts, the mein attract-
ion concerning the manpower resources in Hong Kong lies in its
high quality rather than low wages as such to the Japanese in-
vestors.20
Japan itself is still the leading supplier of production
material to its overseas subsidiaries in Hong Kong. Referring
to the markets of those manufacturing output, the local as well
as other overseas markets get the largest share.
Nevertheless, there are few studies that aimed at providing
a more tAorough analysis onto the managerial patterns and the
operation conditions of the Japanese establishfnerits here in
Hong Kong.21 Ishikawa's study (1981) onto seventeen Japanese
companies in Hong Kong by looking at their special managerial
features as well as their progress and development is surely
one of the most prominent of this kind. The nature of business
of these seventeen firms cover an extensive area in the manufact-
uring sector. The study illustrates that all the Japanese sub-
sidiaries in the survey are found to be in a successful operating
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condition. In all cases, the firm has reported a many folds
increment in sales volume, together with a tremendous expansion
in the firm's size throughout the years of operation.
On the other hand, Ishikawa's study did bring out some
important features of the Japanese firms in Hong Kong in common.
Nearly all of the responding firms in the study possessed a
special managerial attention to either the labor-management
aspect or the quality of products, not to mention a great number
of them having the combination of these two.22
In line with Ishikawa's study, the following three chapters
will concentrate on an indepth study onto the operation condit-
ions of a Japanese manufacturing establishment here in Hong Kong.
A factory, known as factory Y, is chosen for the study. Special
emphasis would then laid on the managerial pattern and practices
of Factory Y. The distinctive operation features will be singled
out and the feedback from the local workers of the establishment
will be particularly looked out.
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CHAPTER IV FACTORY Y- INTRODUCTORY NOTES
Company Y is one of the leadin!- camera producing company
in Japan. The product so produced ranges from single lens and
twin lens camera 35mm cameras 8mm line cameras to 8mm line
projectors slide projectors, editors, binoculars and photographic
accessories.
The company launched for its first overseas expedition
in the 50s when an overseas trading office was set up in the
United States in 1957. Today, the company owns sales offices
in nine respective countries or regions- the United States with
one head office and four regional offices and service stations
West Germany Austria Switzerland Denmark Sweden Canada
Hong Kong and Brazil, with another investment company in Hong
Kong and two manufacturing settings in Hong Kong and in Brazil
respectively. Figure IV.1 displays clearly the relationships
between Company Y Japan and its foreign subsidiary firms.
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Fig. IV.1 The Distribution of Overseas Subsidiary Settings of
Comapny Y Japan (by countries the year of
establ ish & nent)









Ltd., Japan Canada (1976)
(Founded 1945)














Source: Company Y Record, 1981.
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'1. The Hon Kong Expedition: From Joint Venture to Sole Proprietorship
In the late 1960s, the Japanese economy began to grow rapidly
and many Japanese firma found it extremely difficult to secure
sufficient labor force. Hong Kong at that time offered a grand
opportunity with a wealth of relatively cheap yet high quality
labor that could aid a considerable drop in labor cost. Thus,
Hong Kong was so chosen as the very first place to set up a
manufacturing setting outside Japan by Company Y. At the same time,
Hong Kong also provided the merits of the government's laissez-
faire policy that promoted a greater autonomy in running a sub-
sidiary plant.
Together with two other subsidiary units (the Y Investment
Company in 1963 and Company Y Hong Kong in 1968), Factory Y was
set up in Hong Kong in May, 1967, concentrating on camera pro-
duction. Camera parts were mainly sent from Japan and the
conveying and assembling processes were conducted inside the
factory. Up till 1970, Factory Y was operated under the effort
of Japanese and Chinese joint-partnership with each partner
occupied half of the factory's total share. Throughout that
period of time, the Japanese side contributed more in the aspect
of technical know-how and the engineers were sent from Japan whilst
the Chinese partner devoted more effort in the general admin-
istration and management of the factory.
In 1969, Company Y's head office in Japan decided to pro-
ceed to make camera parts within the factory in Hong Kong rather
than solely relied on the supply from the Japan side. As recalled
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by the president of the factory, Mr. S, who has been working in
the factory since February 1970, the main reasons for the Japan
head office to make such a decision were:
(a) Among the total manufacturing cost in camera production,
parts cost is 80 percent or perhaps more of the total while
the assembling cost is well less than 20 percent. Thus cost
reduction in parts production as to let most of them locally
manufactured was essentially required to get better profit.
(b) Company Y also held an ideal of contributing something to the
industrial field of the host environment (i.e. Hong Kong) by
bringing in some advanced technology through making precise
camera parts in Factory Y.
Company Y then proceeded to negotiate with the Chinese
partner concerning the plan for parts production in Factory Y.
Yet, such a long range plan (i.e. the investment in those needed
machines and equipment the accumulated technical experience and
so on) guaranteed no great profit return in the shortest future
which was quite absurd under such a relatively unstable political
and economic environment faced by Hong Kong at that time as
perceived by the Chinese partner.1 The proposal thus saw no
consent from the Chinese partner and finally ended up in a split
between the two parties. Company Y decided to put forth the plan
at its own risk. Thus, Company Y bought the partner's share with
premium proposed by the Chinese partner.
From 1970 onward, Factory Y is under the Japanese sole-
proprietorship. It then engages into the production of the most
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required camera components and assembles the' Y' brand camera
and electronic flashes in the factory and sells all products to
Company Y Hong Kong Limited that responsible for the sales and
marketing of the goods. The total area of the factory is about
150,000 sq. ft. which occupies the ground floor as well as the
2nd, 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th floor in an industrail building
in Kwun Tong district that owned by the Y investment Company,
another subsidiary firm of the Y Company in Hong Kong.
The camera parts and components are now self-manufactured
to a great extent. In addition, the more delicate parts like
camera body and film shutter are sent from Japan with other more
simple components like plastic eye-piece and lamp-win depended
on other local sub-contracting factories. During the early 70s,
the factory tried to look for adequate local camera parts manu-
facturers and sub-contractors for sub-assembling which could
provide the factory with good quality of parts or could proceed
to sub-assemble properly but in vain, showing a lack of facilities
and qualities among the existing ones. Thus, the factory decided
to let somebody set up the new plants for manufacturing sub-
assemble camera parts to suit the factory's requirement. Full
supports were given to such newly established plants. At present,
the factory has several major satellite plants for sub-assembling
and parts production. Generally speaking, there exists an intimate
relationship between the factory and its all other satellites
throughout the production process.
Capital of the factory has risen to HK$500,000 from the
original HK$300,000. In 1980, the sales volume of the factory
63
amounted to HK$60 million as against HK7 million in 1968. The
products of the factory are sent mainly to overseas markets with
customers all over the world. Table IV.1 below shows the dis-
tribution of sales of Factory Y by destination.











Source: Company Records, 1981.
The European and North American countries together account
for nearly half of the total market share. On the other hand,
the Japanese market as well as the local one also obtain a total
of fifteen percent of the market share. All in all, the product-
ion in Factory Y displays an export-oriented nature.
In February 1982, there were altogether 677 employees
%
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including the Japanese factory president) working in the factory.
Table IV.2 displays some basic features of the work force in the
factory.












6441 and over (10.1)
Departments
1.3)Factory Office .Accounting Office 9
21Parts Centre 3.1)
233Assembling Quality Assurance (34.4)
141Optics Production (20.8)
175Machine Shop (25.9)




Source: Company Record of February 1st, 1982.
Note:* Age of the Japanese expatriates and the employees
of the Factory Office Accounting Office as well as
the Service Unit are excluded in the calculation.
Service Unit is a affiliated section of the Factory
Office that generally composed of aged watchmen and
amahs that are responsible for the cleaning and
other miscellaneous job.
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Among the 677 employees, thirteen are Japanese expatriates
and the rest are Chinese staff. The Japanese employees are either
the president, the factory manager, or managers of various depart-
ments.
The medium of communication between the Japanese and the
Chinese employees make use of the English language for the Japanese
cannot command the native dialect. It is natural for the Japanese
expatriates to communicate among themselves with Japanese language
while the Chinese employees speak to each other in Cantonese
The ratio of male to female staff is in a rough proportion
of 40:60 with 282 male and 395 female employees. At the mean time,
about 40 disabled persons are employed in the factory and awards
had been given by the Hong Kong Social Welfare Department for
this effort.
Generally speaking, Factory Y possesses quite a young
working force with over 75 percent of the employees aged 30 or
below. The employees of the factory saw an average educational
standard of secondary level.
The working days in the factory in a week run through
Monday to Saturday with a half-day's off on every Saturday
afternoon. Work starts from 8 a.m. and ends at 5 p.m. with an
hour's lunch time and two ten-minutes' break (one in the morning
and the other in the afternoon session) for most of the employees
in the factory. There are two departments, the Machine Shop
Department and the Optics Production Department, having a two-
shift working system that involves about 46 percent of employees
in the whole factory. These two departments are notable for
their strategic prositior in making those required parts and com¬
ponents for the normal functioning of the coverage and assembly
lines of the factory. The A-shifi. starts from 7 a.m. and ends
at 2:0 p.m. and the B-shift runs from 2:-5 p.m. to 10:15 p.m..
Both shifts enjoy a thirty minutes' meal break and two ten minutes
rest pa use.
2. A Day's life in Factory Y
A typical working time table for most of the employees in
Factory Y in a day is shown in Fig. IV.2 below.





















Broadcasting of the Company Song - the 'Company
Y March' which lasts for about 3 minutes and 10
seconds. Employees are expected to be in their
working positions before the March ends







Bell Rings and a Day's Work Ends
Employees are required to tidy up their working
place before leaving
Note: The above time table excludes those employees working under
the two-shift system and applies to working days from Monday
to Friday, with the Saturday work schedule runs from 07:55
to 12:00 as shown above.
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The employees of the factory are expected to arrive in the
factory some time Lefore actual work starts so that they can
change for their working suits. In most cases, male staff wears
blue jackets and female employees light blue shirts. At the same
time, all the employees are required to change for a pair of
slippers once they enter the factory to avoid the bringing of
dust and dirt to the work setting which is essential for the
production of optical goods. Every employee has his/her own
cabin where he/sloe can keep their own belongings.
The serior staff are requested to reach the factory even
earlier so that meetings can be held between them to discuss on
the work achievement the other day and refreshes every one of the
day's production target and work emphasis.
The company song, which is known as the 'Company Y March'
(instrumental playing), lasts for 3 minutes and 10 seconds, is
broadcasted at about 7:57 a.m. and can be heard everywhere inside
the f-a_ctory. According to the Chinese supervisor, Mr. T, of the
Factory Office, the 'Company Y March' serves two distinctive
functions: as a symbol of the company spirit and. at the same time,
a sort of work preparatory signal to the employees in the factory.
A day's work starts soon. as the 'March' ends.
It then proceeds for a continuous two hours' work. A ten-
minutes' break is offered from 10:00 a.rn. when employees can feel
free to relax themselves as taking in some refreshment, chatting
with their fellow colleagues and so on.
Working for another two hours comes an one-hour lunch
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break. It is common for the employees eating the lunch box that
they have brought along in one of the three canteens (only space
is provided with ro food serving) inside the factory. At the
same time, some staff may go out to have their lunch in the
restaurants or in the food stalls nearby. As for the president,
it is a custom for him to bring along his own lunch box and have
it finished inside the factory.
The afternoon work session. starts at 1:00 p.m. and a further
pause is obtained at 3:00 p.m. when the employees enjoy one another
ten-minutes' break. The whole day's work ends at 5:00 p.m. (exclud-
ing those working in the two shift. system) and the employees are
expected to clean up their working tables and the surrounding places
before they are leeving home.
The next chapter would then proceed to investigate into the
managerial pattern and practice of the factory. The procedures
would follow by first exploring into the distinctive management
philosophy of the organization, then comes the planning and decision
making process; the organizing and staffing techniques; as well as
the reward and motivation systems that so manipulated by the top
management of the organization.
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Footnote: (Chapter IV)
1. According to the president of the Factory Y, the mass riot
of Hong Kong in 1967 had brought along a general sense of
political and economical instability among the business pract-
itioners in the late 60s. Under this circumstances, the Chinese
partners of the factory also did not want to risk themselves by
making a heavy investment in the factory.
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CIIAPTER V FACTORY Y- MANAGERIAL PATTERNS & PRACTICES
1. Management Philosophy of the Factory
A philosophy is a system of thought. It is based on some
orderly, logical statements of objectives, principles, policies
and general methods of approach to the solution of some set of
problems. William Ouchi (1981:41) raised that the basic mechan-
ism of control in a Japanese company is embodied in a philosophy
of management. This philosophy acts as an implicit theory of
the firm and describes the objectives and the procedures to move
towards them. Generally speaking, these objectivies represent
the value of the owners, employees, customers and public at
large. Since the theory is implicit rather than explicit in
nature, it cannot be set down completely in so many sentences.
For those who grasp the essence of this philosophy of values and
beliefs, they can deduce from the general staterent an almost
limitless number of specific rules or targets to suit changing
conditions.
With no exception, Factory Y also possesses its unique
company philosophy. In addition, movement towards such over-
arching objectives is again defined by a set of beliefs and
directions telling what sort of choices tend to work well in the
industry and inside the working setting.
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The management philosophy of Factory Y runs as followed:
To give our customers our best service by providing excell-
ent quality of products and satisfactory after-care with
reasonablerice.
To obtain sufficient profit to develop our business and to
.improve the living of our employees.
To provide desirable field in which our employees can enjoy
their work and cultivate their personality.
To contribute our share to the persperity of community.
Additional guidelines are shaped to further defining the
practice of the above mentioned statements of philosophy in the
firm.
To each of his own standpoint that the employee should
.progressively join and promote the company's growth by
raising concrete proposals to the company and making them
into practice.
To construct a reformative work-place with bright hopes and
affections:
To breed successors possessing creative and autonomous
character, with mutual trust and work together unani-
mously and in good harmony.
To kint sales, production, technology and capital closely
together, and put forth a profound management practice.
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To stress a balanced management and expand the sale, with a
concern in producing high quality goods and offering excell-
ent services.
To each and every employees that their strength is so accu-
mulated to make the brand 'Y' camera a reliable one and
welcomed all over the world.
At the same time,to enhance the ideal of providing high
quality products with reasonable price to the customers. Factory
Y possesses also distinctive management objectives concerning
the assembly operation in the work setting. The 'Y Seisan
System',which translates as 'Y Production System', or simply known
as the 'YSS' among the factory staff, is the factory's objectives
in assembly opera-Lions.
The YSS has its inspiration originated from the production
method of the Toyota Company, one of the leading automobile
manufacturing company in Japan. The Toyota production method
attempts to provide an unique production-alternative to cope with the
present days economic situation that experiences only a low
growth rate with an aim to produce more varieties of goods in
fewer quantities and lower in the production cost. 2
Company Y in Japan has started to learn from the Toyota
example a few years ago. Factory Y followed suit and senior
staff were sent to the Toyota in Japan to see how its production
method work. After a series of trial-and -error to suit the
factory's particular setting, the YSS was finally put into full
practice in January, 1981.
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Producing high quality goods with reasonable price has been
the factory's main concern. It is believed that the only way to
sustain profit of the company should rely on the continuous
effort in keeping the production cost low rather than to lay
this burden on the consumers. Thus, the ultimate and utmost
task of the company's work efficiency is thought to achieve one
fundamental target- to reduce the company's production cost.
At the same time, it is well understood that the manufactur-
ing firms meet'a similar operational expenses in the field of
raw material cost, the power and machinery cost, and in labor
and services. The real discrepancy in production cost between
various firms in the same industry is thought of originate from
how the various firms choose their own kind of production method
and process. In days of ove.rwhelminp economic prosperity and
enormous expansion in markets and productions, the mass scale
production method seemed to work well to keep the production
cost reasonably low. Yet, in an era of relatively low economic
growth, a total reliance on mass production to cut the opera-
tional cost proves no way.3 A series of studies towards the
manufacturing process found that an effective way to keep the
production cost reasonably low should base on a complete avoid-
ance of waste in both material and human resources throughtout
the process that lays the foundation of the 'YSS'. Thus the
central theme of the YSS is to 'get rid of waste' throughout the
production process so as to achieve a further reduction in
production cost that can ensure a better profit return at the
same time.
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To the top management of Factory y, there are two essential
points that related to the idea of 'get rid of waste':
(1). effort should lay towards the direction of using a least
required number of staff to produce the really needed
quantity
(2).efficiency should attain through a well integration of each
individual operative within his/her production lines and,
ultimately, every section in the factory unite as a whole
to achieve an success.
It was found that the most distinctive kinds of waste in
the factory usually sprung from making things too fast, too
early or too much at one time. Unnecessary waste also resulted
from excessive storage or the production of imperfect goods.
Furthermore, the misappropriations in the physical layout of the
production lines' arrangement, the workc.pr`' improper work action,
and the miscalculation of the required working time for each
work action were also thought of bringing in considerable drain-
age in the valuable manpower resources of the factory. It is
believed that by an active effort to get rid of the above
mentioned wastes throughout the production process that a high
raise in working efficiency could possibly attain.
All in all, the statements of philosophy of the factory and
the ether sets of beliefs and directions form a well-integrated
system. According to the president, Mr. S, the philosophy is
spread and shared among the key managers through the more
experienced seniors and at the same time during actual work
practices that the underlying values and beliefs are directed to
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to all other employees to some extent.
2. Planning and Decision Making
If one takes into account that 'management is concerned
with seeing that the job is done, and done efficiently', one
should understand the necessity of planning.4 This function,
which is the highest that management can perform and, in its most
general aspects, is reserved for -top management, includes two
parts: the statement of principles, policies and procedure on
the one hand and the decision making on the other.
The statement of principles constitute a set of ideas or
ideals to which the firms aspires to confirm and creates a
general backdrop of coordination that greatly facilitates
decision making and planning over special issues.
Since the management philosophy as well as some guiding
principles of Factory Y had been displayed in the previous
sections, the following paragraphs go straight to investigate
into the factory's approach in decision making.
In Factory Y, the responsibility of planning and :raking
decisions is well concentrated on the top managerial level. The
president and the Japanese department managers have regular
weekly meetings to discuss the key issues of the factory and to
formulate appropriate production plans and strategies. In some
cases, special meetings between the Japanese staff are held when
in need.
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Parallel to this is a Chinese staff meeting that takes
place also once a week. The Chinese staff meeting is headed by
the Chinese manager of the Factory Office and participated by
the supervisors and sometimes group leaders of the respective
sections. The Chinese manager as well as the two supervisors in
the'Factory Office act as an important communication bridge
between the Japanese top management and the Chinese senior staff
in the decision making process. The Japanese president would
inform the Chinese manager and the two supervisors the detail of
programmes and suggestions made in the Japanese staff meeting.
In the Chinese staff meetings, the so proposed decisions are
discussed and eventually diffused outward to cover each and
every employee concerned. The feedbacks from the Chinese staff
in the meeting are so reflected to the president through the
Chinese manager.
In case there were important issues concerning the whole
factory, meetings would be held involving the top management and
representatives of all staff.
3. Organization and Staffing
Organizing has consequently been defined as 'the process of
determining the necessary activities and positions within an
enterprise, department or group, arranging them into the most
effective functional relationships, defining the authority,
responsibility and duties of each and a,sifp-ning them to
individuals so that effort is coordinated towards a common ends.'5
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Naturally, the activity consists in the grouping of similar
activities forms organizational units. As indicated in Figure V.1,
there were altogether nine departments in the factory. Among
these, two (the Engineeing Design Department and the Accounting
Office) were under the direct supervision of the president,
Mr. S, at the same time. The other seven departments- Factory
Office Parts Centre Department Assembling and Quality Assurance
Department Optics Production Department Machine Shop Department
Metal Finishing Department and finally, Packing & Packaging
Department, were under the joint-control effort of the president
and the factory manager.
With the exception of Packing Packaging Department and
Accounting Office, all the other seven department are headed by
department managers. There is only one Chinese department
managers while the others are all expatriate from Japan. It
indicates an overwhelming influence of the Japanese in the top
managerial level.6
In the larger departments like Assembling Quality Assurance
Optics Production and Machine Shop, there are two to three
department managers instead of one. In these departments, work
load is generally shared among these managers with each one of
them responsible for a particular functional area in their
respective section.
Fig. V.1 Factory Y: Organization Chart
(in departments in number of



















Source: Company Records of November, 1981.
Notes: (1) All positions stated in this chart are filled by
Japanese except in the Factory Office where a
Chinese manager heads.
(2) In some departments with a greater number of employees,
there are two to three department managers. Work load
is generally shared,among them with each responsible
for a particular functional area in the respective
department.
79
The formal work flow among the various sections in the
factory is displayed in Figure V.2. Once the production plan is
decided by the top management and the desired models are designed
by the Design Unit, the Parts Centre Department strives its effort
in procuring those needed raw materials and components for produc-
tion. Parts like camera bodies and shutters (i.e., those parts
that required higher production technology) are sent directly
from Japan and the more simple plastic parts are supplied from
some local sub-contractors. At the same time, the Factory also
produces over 85% of the required parts. Those needed materials
,so gathered are sent to the respective departments for processing
and finishing. The so manufactured or finished parts are thus
sent for final assembly. The Quality Assurance unit helps to
maintain a good product by regular inspections. The final
products are then packed and delivered to the clients concerned.
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Undoubtedly, the above mentioned work flow process may fall
short of an oversimplification of the total formal structure and
function of the units. The exchange of information and the
process of decision making, testing, and checking do not proceed
in the major direction indicated (from top to bottom on the chart).
Lin6 sections such as the Machine Shop may tell the Engineering
and Design Department the easiest way to a given part of product
veteran workers in the production sections may tell designers and
the top management that their plans have some deficiencies in
safety or efficiency; the production units may advice the Parts
Centre group in the purchasing of materials and parts, and the
like. Thus, there sees a feedback loop between the various
departments involved in the work process. In general, however,
the direction of work flow is as shown in Figure V.2.
In February, 1982, there were altogether 677 employees working
in the factory. As can be seen in Table V.1, the top managerial
staff (i.e. the president, the department managers, and the
supervisors) in Factory Y occupied a proportion of well less than
four percent of the total. A total of 86.5% of the employees were
production operatives (i.e. junior technicians and common workers)
that directly involved in the conveying and assembling processes.
Table V.I Role Differentiation in Factory Y







































Source: Company Records of February 1st, 1982.
Note: The factory saw an re-organization programme in
March, 1982, that some modifications have been
made concerning the above mentioned titles.
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The hierarchy of command flow in Factory Y is futher display-
ed in Figure V.3. The command flows from the president and the
factory manager to the department managers of various sections.
Supervisors of the respective department receive orders from the
managers and they are aided by the engineers in the technical
aspect and the clerical staff in the clerical field. The super-
visors take the responsibility to understand the managers' plan
and then make concrete programmes for each basic working units
under his/her control, and to achieve them in actual production
through satisfactory labor control, production control and
improving the production methods.
The command then goes further to the group leaders which are
assisted by the technician grade. The assistant group leaders
received instructions from their seniors and with the help of
the junior technicians that the specific work task is spreading
to the basic working groups below which consist of ten to fifteen
workers in each. The semi-skilled and especially unskilled
workers are evenly distributed into each basic unit. One assis-
tant group leader is basically responsible for one basic working
group. The maintask of the assistant group leader is to divide
the group's job to each worker adequately, to train unskilled
and semi-skilled workers efficiently and kindly, and to check
progress of work against schedule and takes necessary action.
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Source: Company Records of November, 1981.
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At the same time, on-the-job-training is provided to the
employees. The newly recruited production operatives are usually
placed among the more skillful one so that they can learn from
their experienced seniors throughout their working process. The
production operative who possessed the potentially of will-be
assistant group leaders in the feature would train additionally.
The on-the-post assistant group leaders are provided with another
training for high technology and administration. At the end of
this stage, some assistant group leaders are promoted to group
leaders who shall control two to four assistant group leaders
and finally to the supervisors grade who can control two to four
group leaders.
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4. Reward and Motivation System
The motivation of employees is related to the organization's
reward system. The belief that reward will serve to motivate
performance, reduce turnover and absenteeism, and attract quali-
fied job applicants presummes that rewards themselves influence
employee motivation in predictable ways.? In general, we can say
that people will tend to behave in ways that the organization
rewards. Therefore, the anticipation of rewards can operate as
a strong incentive motivating a level of behavior and job
performance or motivating the choice of an organization as a
place to work.
Rewards for working in organizations can be roughly divided
into two kinds- the intrinsic rewards and the extrinsic rewards.8
The intrinsic rewards refer to the kinds of pleasures that are
experienced in doing the work itself. These include such i.Iore
intangible type of things such as feelings of competence, comple-
tion, and self-actualization. The extrinsic rewards are the
more tangible external type that are controlled by the organ-
ization. Extrinsic rewards include the following: financial
rewards as reflected in wage or salary being paid to the indiv-
idual fringe benefits such as paid':. vacation time, sick leave,
meal subsidy and any other discretionary payment other than
direct wage or salaries promotion and incentive plans as to
encourage participation and performance among employees informal
group activities which provide chances for individual to socialize
0
and share information about work with others.9
All in all, intrinsic rewards are those that seem to satisfy
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higher order needs and are administered by individual to himself
or herself while extrinsic rewards are those administered by an
external person or organization. The following paragraphs would
devote solely onto the extrinsic aspect of rewards that provides
by the management of Factory Y to motivate the employees incen-
tive and commitment towards work and to the organization.
To enhance employees' commitment towards the firm, a
relatively employment security is provided to all employees.
The Japanese managers believe that job security has a positive
impact on moral and productivity, limits turnover and training
costs, and increases the organizations cohesiveness. Since the
company and the employees in it are treated as an integrated
whole. Employees would not be discharged from their post any
thing less than very serious misconducts and there comes formal
warnings to ensure an understanding between the two parties
before any further action proceeds.10 A freeze of new hiring to
replace those voluntarily leaving their post is the main tactic
employed by the factory in facing a less favourable economic
circumstance rather than to discharge part of its work force.
In 1980, the company record saw no employee being dismissed by
the management.
At the same time, Factory Y does not adopt piece-rate or
daily-based pay system. Rather all the employees of the whole
factory are regarded as permanent staff and paid on a monthly
base. The average monthly salary (with allowance included) of
the factory staff as recorded in December 1981 is exhibited in
Table V.2.
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Table V.2 Factory Y: Average Monthly Salary and Allow-









1,530.00Junior Technician & Common Worker*
Source: Company Records in December, 1981.
Note:* According to the president of the factory,
junior technicians are in a similar rankings
as the common workers for they need to take
up the common workers' task to a great extent.
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For employees with assistant group leader grade or below
with good attendance, an extra allowance of HK$120 per month. is
distributed to the respective staff. Furthermore, employees with
ranking higher than assistant group leader can get HK$150 per
month and those below HK$5 per day as meal subsidy. Moreover, a
post allowance ranged from HK$50 to HK$500 per month is given to
employees with junior technician title or above. One month's
extra pay is sent to all staff by the end of the year. In addition,
a kind of monetary reward is given to those employees with excell-
ent performance throughout the year and the sum of money ranged
from HK$500 to HK$1,000. When the year ends, performance records
of the employees in the year are submitted to the top management
through their respective department. Meetings will be held by
the managerial staff to discuss on which employee should deserve
to get the reward and the amount of such. Generally speaking,
those employees that could fulfill their duties nicely and pro-
perly or could further improve their work efficiency would
possibly get such a kind of monetary reward.
A long-service allowance system is practised in Factory Y
since 1970. The employees would automatically receive an extra
sum of HK$1C per month when he/she had been working in the factory
for each consecutive year. The allowance goes up to a maximum
of HK$50 per month under this system (i.e. up to a service period
of five years). As recalled by the president, an extra amount
ranged from HK$OO to HK$50 per month was quite an attraction
to the workers concerning the living standard in Hong Kong at
the early 70s.
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Together with the long-service allowance, a practice of
periodical adjustment of employees' salary is adopted in the early
70s. The management guarantees to increase periodically the
employees' salary for fixed amount on April lst and October lst
every year, regardless of the special adjustment with a different
yearly rate that determine by the top management to suit the
outside environment which may be usually performed just after the
Chinese New Year. The amount of periodical salary adjustment
and long service allowance are fixed and had not been raised
since the time of commencement.
Shortly speaking, periodical adjustment of salaries is
Japanese traditional custom whilst the long service allowance is
a special practice made by the top management of Factory Y to
suit the local situation. These two monetary incentives were
deliberately employed by the top management to tackle the labor-
turnover problems ever since the Japanese got the complete
ownership of the factory. In addition to the above treatment,
the factory has proceeded also another method to gear the problem
of excessive turnover, a situation that is rather uncomf,on in
Japan. The factory provides suitable jigs, special tools, fix-
tures, attachment to machines and equipment and also convenient
testors and gauges to simplify job method, by which even unskilled
workers can do easily and efficiently their job without mistakes.
The factory strived to offer greater promotion chance for
the employees in such a way that the top and middle management
staff are basically the promotion of the preceding lower grades
rather than directly recruited from outside. The criteria for
91
positional promotion are many. Naturally, positional promotion
brings along monetary increment. In case of positional promotion
for the technical staff, emphasis would lay more on their working
ability and performance, then comes their character and personality
as well as other factors like attendance. Whilst for administr-
ation and management position, the candidates' personality count
most for they would require to have more contact with other
employees. Moreover, the evaluation does not simply base on
what the el,:ployee is clearly realized at the present but also
what is latent or will be actualized in the near future. In
1980, about six peg cent of the employees in the factory got
promoted.
Referring to the physical layout of the work setting, the
factory is fully air-conditioned with sitting rooms and three
canteens (only place for eating is provided with no food serving).
The work place is kept clean and tidy to fulfill the requirement
in the production of optical goods.
The employees in Factory Y get a half-day's off on Saturdays
and a whole day's off every Sundays. In 1982, besides the Labor
Department declared ten days' official lobor holiday, the factory
also offers its employees a week's annual leave (with four days
being fixed and the rerlmL fining three freely chosen by the respec-
tive employee) as well as a total of another seven days' factory
special holiday that scattered in the year.
Also, other welfare facilities provide to the staff include
medical care with a fixed medical-free subsidy paid sick-leave;
and labor insurance that covers each and every employee in the
factory.
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In the early days of operation, Factory Y provided recreat-
ional activities to all employees on a company-wide basis. It soon
discovered that a complete reliance on company-wide recreational
activities might fall short of covering the interest of more
employees, there existed a differentiation in individual preferences
and in employees' composition in the respective section (say, for
example, the Assembly Quality Assurance Department had much more
female staff than the male one). Thus, two kinds of recreational
activities are then provided by the factory to the staff. The
company-wide activity involves the staff of the whole factory that
includes an end-of-year feast and a company picnic that takes place
once a year. In addition, a sum of HK$5 per month is offered to
each employee by the factory as departmental recreational fu.?nd.
Each department has its own recreation committee that decided the
kind of activities for the staff within de :artment.
On the other hand, the top nanagemerit of Factory Y sees also
a great emphasis on the human relations in the factory to ahcieve
a harmonious working relationship between employees. Sense of unity
among staff is strived to attain. Every employee in the factory is
expected to be treated fairly and unanimously. Differentiation
between employees as rooted in the various work status they hold
is trying to keep down to the lowest possible - all employees are
paid on a monthly base, and, every employee in the factory, no
matter he/she is administrative staff that works in the office or
line staff in the assembly section, have to wear the company uniform.
The wearing of company uniform was quite a recent practice for the
office staff (starting from November 1981) while the production
operatives kept this practice ever since the factory set uup.
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'I could sense that the line workers got a feeling that we admin-
strative staff were quite the same as them when I first walked
along the production lines with my uniform on,' recalls a
senior female administrative staff in the Factory Office.
Open communication between employees are encouraged and even
inherent in the factory's work setting. Open work space are
filled with individuals at different hierarchical. level. and even
the high ranking staff as department managers seldom have their
separate private office. To take the design of the physical
layout of the Factory Office as an illustration, the clerical
staff can communicate with the department manager easily by merely
a slight alteration of their seats.
Furthermore, the top management of Factory Y also shows
a sensitive concern towards the employees' feeling and takes
serious consideration on such reactions. To show this effort
with a case- the production operatives were once ordered by
the management to wear hats while working to avoid the possibi-
lity of falling hair onto the precision instrument. It soon
found that the female operatives start to work without wearing
a hat on Saturdays for fears that their permanent waved hair
might be disfigured. The top management finally abolished the
wear-a-hat edict after a long consideration and the news was
welcomed by the female workers with big applause.
94
5. The 'YSS' in Operation
Producing high quality goods with reasonable price to
the customers is one of the main concern of the factory in
production process. In the process of doing so, strict quality
assurance is greatly emphasized and the Quality Assurance section
contributed much in maintaining a high quality product. Quality
inspectors are sent from Japan in a fixed time interval to ensure
a perfect quality of goods. At the same time, the central con-
cern of 'get rid of waste' under the 'Y Production System' is
thought to help a lot in keeping down the production cost as
well as in improving the production's quality.
To put the central concern of 'get rid of waste' in practice,
the following two points act as some important guidelines:
(1) Just in time production
(2) Automation
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Generally speaking, 'just in time production' denotes a
condition in ilakiyg the really wanted material within the really
needed time period. The product are manufactured in such a way
that the required quanitities, types, and time schedule are all
averaged to yield a well-balanced production process. To achieve
this, three predetern11inants noteworthy.
Firstly, the appropriate line tact is determined with reference
to the various production figures so demanded (i.e. the production
quantity so desired the material so needed the time so required
to achieve this, and the like.) These figures are varied and
adjusted to suit the respective sales de,:and.
Secondly, production process proceeds only under the require-
ment and demand of the following work process. The traditional
components conveying system is turned upside down in this case.
Normally, a conventional assembly line consists of isolated groups
of people all dependent upon supplies form preceding groups. A
hold-up in one can stop the whole line unless each group maintains
a sufficiently large stock of parts. Thus each group tries to get
as far ahead of the schedule as possible, adding to the stockpile of
parts. The YSS puts the traditional components conveying system
the other way round. The final assembly in the production process
is taken as the starting point instead. The production plan as
the production volume and time schedule is first assigned to the
final assembly line. The components conveying r:,ethod is reversed
so that the latter production groups collect their needed Parts
and material from their res,ective preceding .rocesses. The preceding
processes now produce on the demand of the following ones.
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Thirdly, a spontaneous work flow should strive to attain. In
achieving this, the needed equipment for production are so arranged
to aid a smoother work action. At the same time, the flow of
conveying parts in the assembly lines are so ordered that the
components come one by one from the preceding process in a fixed
time-sequence.
Another supporting pillar of the YSS is the iir.portance of
automation. It should be reminded that the so called automation
in the YSS does not mean simple as just to let the machine works.
What the YSS stresses is an automation process that assimilates
the human element. The machines are so designed to possess the
human wit (i. e. sorting out of imperfect products while the production
process still goes on) so that more labor force can be actually
saved to contribute to other work items. At the same time, work
actions of each operative increases so that they can have a better
understanding towards the work procedure as to increase the work
efficiency and facilitate a better control towards such.
In addition, a kind of management tool, the 'kanban', which
translates as 'sign-card', is employed in the process of the YSS.
The kanbans are paper-cards coated with plastice bags that designed
to avoid overproduction and to ensure a :.ore systematic management.
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of kanban being utilised
in the factory. One attaches to the receiving or delivery orders and
is used by the latter work process in getting the required components
for production from the preceding one according to this. The technique
of kanban helps to prevent overproduction and excess in delivery in
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that no iroduction or delivery made possible without the kanban
instruction. The other type of kanban is widely used to display
openly the production quantities, time needed in each process,
production methods and steps as well as the ar,ount and contents of
those required parts, storing place and so on for each delivery.
Thus, each operative involved can now be more familiar with his
own working procedures, avoids ambiguity, and attains a minimum
possibel waste throLighout the process.
Furthermore., the manufacturing of precision instruments as
optical goods demand a clean and tidy setting. To aid a spontaneous
work process and to keep the work setting clean and tidy, the
production operatives are instructed by a 'Four S' principles.
'Seidon' denotes a well-formulated distribution in the placement
of various parts to achieve the greatest efficiency during the work
process. 'Seiri' means a state of putting the respective components
in a good order. 'Seiso' refers to keeping one's working place
clean and tidy. And finally, 'Seikitsu' signifies such a state of
cleanliness persists on. In addition, the operatives are expected to
keep these virtues and eventually spreading these to the colleagues
around them.
To enhance a deeper understanding towards the working of the
YSS, the actual working practices in the assembly section is so
singled out and make illustrations on. (See Figure V.4.)
The layout of the assembly lines are modified to suit the YSS.
Thus, instead of following straight lines, the conveyor belts in
the final assembly lines take a horse-shoe form. Kanbans are hung
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conveying hanging 'kanban'(signcard) to
belt
show the number of operatives
the kind and quantity of the
product made, and the time
required for each conveying
cycle of the line.
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to show clearly the steps of the related work process. The number
of assembling procedures that each operative can watch increase.
The total number of operatives in each assembling line drops from
a former figure of about 70 to a number of around 25 at present.
At the same time, new comers are first placed on the table nearby to
get familiar with each and every component and work procedures that
they are supposed to take up in the future. A signal is so flashed
up on a large banks of lights above each operative along the assembling
line. The conveying parts are flowing along the conveyor belts to
scattered operators in a fixed time-sequence. The employees are
encouraged to spot out even the slightest defect during the work
process and to solve them through group effort as far as they can.
Whenever work trouble happens or the operative wants to leave his/
her position for a while, he/she could press the light signal on
to arouse the attention of the consultants (i.e. the junior tech-
nicians or assistant group leader) that stationed on each assembling
line. In case of a serious defect in production occurs, t,.ze
consultants would make the decision as to stop the whole production
line by using again the light signal to find out the underlying
problem leading to such before further production ,roceed. To stop
the whole line right on the spot to find out the underlying problem
is till preferred than to get a stock file of imperfcct good in the
future.
Indeed, as reflected in the assembly lines' operation, the YSS
enjoys an advantage in trouble shooting on the spot. The increase
in the operatives' span of control enables them to be more familiar
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with the work process and thus can detect the production faults
more easily. On the other hand, being used to deal with preceding
groups in his day to day operation, to obtain components, a senior
operative has little hesitat-*.on in approaching these groups when
faulty parts arrive at his section.
6. Concluding Remarks
In March, 1982, the top management of Factory Y started to
introduce a re-organization programme in the work force. However,
the field work of the present study ended at about April while the
whole re-organization programme was still in its embroynic stage.
Therefore, detailed information and adequate analysis on the programme
could not be possibly attained.
The first step of re-organization saw an alternation of some
of the former work titles into new ones and at the same time, offering
more places for the Chinese staff to be in the top managerial level.
The original 'assistant group leader' and 'group leader' grades
were merged to form the 'foreman' group that controls one basic
working group which composed of seven to sixteen workers, with some
former group leaders possessed good quality promoted to the 'supervisor'
level. The post of 'assistant manager' was inserted to form an
administration group in his/her department together with the depart-
ment manager rather than a subordinate of the depart:nnent manager.
Altogether five Chinese staff were then appointed as assistant manager
(in the departments of Parts Centre; Assembly Quality Assurance;
Machine Shop; Metal Finishing and Packing; Packaging) with four
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other local engineering and clerical staff occupying a rank similar
to assistant manager.
Moreover, the re-organization also laid an effort to further
promote the local employees to the department manager grade within
one to three years. Undoubtedly, it foresees a growing involvement
of the Chinese employees into the top managerial level of the
factory. According to the president, the company has an ideal to
let all the manager positions filled up by local staff in the future
with the Japanese expatriates mainly acted as consultants or advisors
to the local staff rather than directly involved into the rnanagei: ent
of the departments.
In addition, the allowance system was readjusted to suit the
new programme. For those with 'supervisor' title or above, the
attendance allowance and the long service allowance were then
cancelled. And, for those with 'assistant manager' grade or above,
the meal allowance was thus withdrawn. Nevetheless, the post
allowance still retained. To the president, such trivial sum and
types of allowance should no longer count as a method to facilitate
the cornriiitment and performance of the middle and upper management
staff. Instead, further job-enrichiiient and better promotion chances
for the qualified persons were the joint. Yet, to compensate the
apparent loss of pecuniary terms, adjustments were made by including
the former allowance into basic salary and/or other transactions.
On the other hand, a job-rotation training programme was
proposed and .planned to spread by first among the upper managerial
employees in the coming days. For persons who were much expected of
would enter in a management training position, they would then posted
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into non-specialized or non-experienced departments to learn and
better-equipped themselves. It is thought that through such a kind
of job-rotation training that the employee could eventually become
a more a bled person and a multi-purpose staff. And, at the same
tiifie, they could get many good friends and would assimilate to the
culture of the organization in the process.
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CHAPTER VI FACTORY Y - ORGANIZATION PERFORMANCE EMPLOYEES'
FEEDBACK
As illustrated in the preceding section, the top management
of Factory Y strived to achieve their ultimate company ideal in
providing excellent quality goods and services to their customers
with reasonable price to sustain profit return for further organ-
izational development and to improve the living standard of the
employees and, at the same time, to offer a desirable work setting
for the employees and to contribute to the community's prosperity.
To achieve this, however, organization must meet aucillary
goals such as to keep a steady growth in the company's sales volume
and profit return to improve the work skill and the product's
quality, to tackle the _proble-.is of employees absenteeism and labour
turnover as to increase the labor productivity to consolidate the
employees' commitment towards the organization, and the like.
The preceding chapter saw an exhibit of those strategies and
practices that were so manipulated by the top management of Factory
Y in achieving the cherished organization goals. The following
paragraphs attempt to detect the effectiveness of such. The
analysis would proceed by first exemplifying the general performance
of the factory throughout the operation years as indicated in the
sales and profit figures the expansion in organizational size as
reflected in the employi?ient figures the rate of absenteeism and
labor turn-over, and so on.
On the other hand, organization achievement can also be
detected by examining the employees' subjective view and impression
towards the company. As a happy work setting with harmonious
and integrating employee relationship is aimed to attain by the
top management of Factory Y, effort would also lay on exploring
how the production operatives (i.e. the junior technicians and
common workers) perceived their present working situation based
on the information collected through the distribution of quest¬
ionnaire s.
1, Organization Performance
The president of the factory, by looking back at the past
thirteen years during which he has managed, feels satisfied towards
the company's achievement and has a very optimistic view towards
the factory's future. Capital has risen from an original of
HK$300,000 to a figure of HK$500,000 currently. The factory has
retained a work force of approaching 700 in February 1982, as
compared to a figure of around 200 in 1970.
As shown in Table VI.1, Factory Y saw a steady increase in
sales volume and profit return throughout the years of operation.
Sales of the factory surged to an amount of IIK'j|70 . illion in the
fiscal year 8O-81, against a figure of less than HK$3 million in
71-72. Profit return of the factory also met a tremendous growth.
Tli profit return r ached a climax of over HK$8 mi] Lion in 7 '-80
financial year, with the 8O-81 figure maintained an amount of about
HKS3 million as compared with HK$87,399- 0 in 71-72. According
to the president, the remarkable increase in the sales volume and
profit return in the late 70s mainly resulted from the factory's
improvemei t in technology and in starting to produce more valuable
camera parts and optical products.i. — —
Table VI.1 Factory Y: Sales and Profit, 1971-1981

































Rote: All fiscal years start at April 1st and end March 31st
the next year with the exception of:
197 which started from April 1st and ended December 31st;
197.5 which started January 1st and ended December 31st;
1975-1977 which started January 1st, 76 and terminated
March 31st,77-
On the other hand, as recalled by the supervisor of the
Factory Office, the labor productivity in the aseernbly lines saw
a remarkable growth from a daily average of 3-6 cameras per line
worker in 1976 to a figure of 10 to 12 cameras in 1981. The average
daily defective rate in the production lines also falls from the
former of about 30% to well less than 10% at present.
Furthermore, Factory Y has maintained an employees' attendance
rate a monthly average of well over 93% (items like annual leave,
maternity leave, sick leave were also included in counting for
absenteeism) throughout the operation years.
Concerning the rate of labor turnover, Factory Y maintained
a monthly average of 3-9% (or an annual rate of 66.51 %) in the
year 1980. The turnover rate was so calculated via dividing the
number of employees resigned from the company at a month by the
sum total of the number of newly recruited employees in that month
and the number of employees registered at the end of the preceding
month. As shown in Table VI.2, it illustrated a genera] view cf
higher turn-over in the periods from February through May as well
as during the summer months of August and September. This could be
accounted by the fact that many on-movers tended to wait until the
Chinese New Year period when they could get their double-pay of the
year in the first case, the leaving of those part-time student-
workers after their summer vacation in the latter.
Indeed, the factory's accomplishment in stabilizing its
work force is perhaps more obvious if we further compare its la.bcr
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turnover rate with the outside figure that soared high as 50% to
100% annually among many industrial settings in Hong Kong as
reported by some commentators.1



















In February, 1982, 23% of the Chinese employees had been
working in the factory for a period of we11 over five years, with
a further 96.8% from one to five years. For those working for a
period of one year or less, it occupied 30.2% of the Chinese
employees' total (see Table VI.3).
Table VI.3 Factory Y: Length of Service among Chinese
Staff
Length of Service N
3 years or more
1 yeai 5 years
1 year or less
Total









Generally speaking, the top management's effort in keeping
a steady business and. organizational growth can be taken as a
promising one. There saw a].so a remarkable achievement of the
factory in maintaining a more stable work force. On the other•
hand, the company goals of Factory Y also hold an ideal of making
every one in the factory happy by offering a desirable work place
under which the employees can enjoy their work and. cultivate their-
personality. As reflected in the managerial patterns and practices
of Factory Y, human resources is considered as the most valuable
company asset and an integrating work force with harmonious and
intimate staff relationship is strived to attain. Yet to the
extent such abstre.ct company ideal has been satisfactory fulfilled,
the subjective feeling of the employees towards their present
working condition and staff relationship also acted as an import¬
ant. detecting tool.
2. Employees'Feedback : Integration Towards t he Or ganizati on
Based on the information gathered by distributing structuredi
questionnaire to the production operatives of the factory, the
attitudes of the employees in the sample towards their present
employment were obtained.
Sample Characteristics
A total of 95 operatives responded to the questionnaire.
Table VI. A sum; arizes the characteristics of the sample in terms
of sex, age, mar:tal status, educational standard, and their first
age of entering the job market.
Table VI. A Distribution of Sample by Sex, Age, Marital
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Note: Fi ve female respondents failed to disclose their
ages in these two items.
%As shown in Table VI. 7, the sex and age distribution of the
sample runs a ratio similar to the factory total. Over 80% of the
respondents were young people with age below twenty-five and most
of them were single (86.3%)- The employees of the factory possessed
an average of secondary educational standard, the sample also
illustrated such a feature. 73-7% of the respondents had received
secondary school education with only 13-7% primary standard or below.
Furthermore, there saw a bulk of the respondents entering the job
market at a rather early age - 28.9% of the sample started their
first job before 20, with a figure of 73-6% of them even before 17-
Concerning the respondents' present status in the factory
(see Table VI,3)? 31-6% were of junior technician rank with the
remaining 68.7% common workers. 7.2% of the sample came from the
Parts Centre Department; 3%-7%, from the Assembly rind Quality
Assurance Department; 30.5% from the Machine Shop Department;
3-3% from the Metal Finishing Department; 7.2% from the Packing
and Packaging Section, and finally, 21.1% frcm the Optics Production
Department. Generally speaking, the respondents from each depart¬
ment in the sample corresponded to a ratio of the factory total.
The basic monthly salary of the respondents ranged frcm HK$1,000
to a maximum of HK$1,600, with an average cf HK$1,220 per month.
Monthly allowance went frcm HK$120 to HK$700 with a. mean of around.
HK$280. At the same time, 13-8% of the sample had been vorking in
the factory for more than five years with another 72.6% a period
between one to five years.
Table VI.3 Distribution of Sample by Their Present Working
Status, Remunerations, Length of Service
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As raised in Chapter III, the labor market in Hong Kong
has long been notable for its extreme volatile nature in which
workers shifting their employments frequently. The sample also
illustrated such a charateristics to a great extent. Despite the
fact .that the respondents are generally young people below 2H, they
had quite a lot of okher working experiences and change of employments
were rather common among them in the past. A great majority (81.1)
of the sample reported of having work experience in other firms
before taking up their present employment (see Table VI.6)











Among those 77 respondents that have other working experience,
77.3% of them had taken a number of at least two other jobs before
working in Factory Y (see Table VI.7) •
Table VI.7 Number of Jobs Taken Before Present Employment
















Yet, what made those respondents quitting from their previous
jobs? An investigation into such reasons may help to expose the
kinds of work constraints that conceived by the respondents as
decisive in making them stay or leave their work positions. As
postulated in Table VI.8, reasons for those leaving their last job
were many. Among these, causes like 'inadequate pay'; 'dissatisfied
job nature'; 'insufficient welfare facilities'; and 'poor prospect
in promotion or salary raise' accounted more for their leaving.
There came also less significant items as 'unfair boss or seniors'
i
and 'poor working environment'.
Table VI. 8 Reasons for Leaving the Last Job




Di 8S 3 L 1 sfied Job Nature
Poor Prospect for Promotion or Salary Raise
Unfair Boss or Senior-
Poor Working Environmentor
Insecure Job
Poor Staff Rc1ationshi j)
Bad Staff Composition













Note: Total counts do not corresponds to the total
number of respondents for they could choose
more than one item.
All in all, the information gathered so far illustrated
the sample a general outlook of young and unmarried production
operatives of the factory; mostly secondary educated and entering
_i. o tj o (. i
the job market at quite an early age. The respondents are highly
mobile in the sense that a great many of them have quite some other-
working: experiences prior their present employment in Factory Y.c i j_ J. r o-
The main reasons that accounted for their leaving the last job
related more to the dissatisfaction towards the remunerations, the
nature of the job, the working environment as well as the staff
relationships under their previous employment.
Employee Cohesiveness
The remaining items in the questionnaires were conceptualized
as measures of employees' integration towards the factory that the
top management of Factory Y strives to attain at the same time.
Process of internal integration have the function of co¬
ordinating the differentiated parts of an organization. Undoubtedly,
a highly integrated work force surely be indispensable to an organ¬
ization to perform effectively and efficiently. Specifically,
integration will here refer to the ways in which, and to the degree
to which, the employee is informally socially integrated to the
company. The concept of social integration was then disaggregated
into a few sub-concepts - employee cohesiveness; company involvement;
and employee commitment towards the organization.
Employee cohesivencss is defined as the extent and the
intensity of social bond (i.e. work relationship, friendship),
among the employees of the organization. An intimate in-work and off-
work relationship between employees could enhance a spirit of co¬
operation and unity in the work place.
Table VI.9 displays the frequency of in-work contact between
the respondents and their seniors (both the Japanese and Chinese)
as well as with their fellow colleagues. Generally s, caking, the
sample illustrated a tendency of much more in-work contact with the-
Chinese employees as a whole than with the Japanese staff. This
could be accounted by the fact that the Japanese seniors were
solely those with manager title and thus in the ton most position- -l. _L
in the command hierarchy whilst the respondents were in the botto
most of the command flow. Fewer in-work contact between these two
categories could be expected in this case.
Table VI.9 In-work Contact with Seniors Fellow Colleagues





































As for the in-work contact between other Chinese staff
(i.e. Chinese seniors or fellows colleagues), their saw not a
great contrast in the intensity between these two categories. It
illustrated a slightly ...ore initmate work relationship with their
fellow colleagues than with their Chinese seniors but the difference
is not of a great sifnificance. Over 89% of the respondents
considered that they have some or many in-work contact with their
fellow workers while these with their Chinese and Japanese seniors
were 89.2% and 33-8% respectively.
As an indicator on the state of labor - management commun¬
ication as perceived by the workers at the work level, the resp¬
ondents were asked for their opinions concerning whether their
seniors were aware of their problems in connexion to work (see
Table VI.10).
13-$ of the sample thought that their seniors were 'quite
well aware' of their- on-the-job problems while as high as 71-2
considered their top management 'aware of some' of such problems.
Only 1 )°r of the respondents did not regard their seniors having
conscious of such problems at all.
Table VI.10 In-work Communication (Are your seniors aware of














Note: 0ne respondent failed to answer this item.
A sense of unity among employees is highly cherished by the
top management of Factory Y. The respondents were then asked for
their subjective perception towards the unity in work anonp theJ -L J- -
employees in the factory. As indicated in Table VI.11, a greater
portion of the san ie showed a negative (i.e. the 'no' iiern with
59.2?' of the respondents) attitude with the remaining AO.lp
admitted a sense of unity among employees in the work place.











Note: Two respondents failed to answer this item.
To see whether such background attributes like sex, age,
work status and length of service of the respondents would
possibly exert any effect on their perception towards work unity,
Tables VI 12, 13? 19, 13 display such associations.
For those respondents aged 20 or below, they would be treated
as having a low level of age. For those between 21 to 30, they are
classified as reaching medium age level and those over 31 ar'e
termed as possessing a higher age level.
Work status is divided into two categories: those respondents
with 'common workers' title are conceived as having a lower work
status and these 'junior technicians' are thought of having a higher
work status.
Length cf service denotes the years of service in the
company and is classified into three ty es. A working period for
2 years or less is considered as ha vine low level of service lenath- )
a period for more than 2 years but less than h years are termed as
owning a medium level of service length and those working for
yea.rs or more are taken as reaching a high level of service length.
Perception tovards work unity is divided into two kinds.
When the answer is 'yes', the respondent is grouped as having- a
high perception towards work unity inside the working setting.
The 'no' answer would then considered as possessing a low level
of perception towards such.
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Gaiiirna — + u • 77
Table VI.15 Perception of Work Unity by Length of



















Since the sample of the study was not drawn vith a random
sampling procedure, the statistical significance of the relation¬
ships were not tested.
Table VI.12 shows that the gamma coefficient of the
correlation between sex (female) and perception towards work unity
is -0.2y6. The gamma coefficient suggests that knowing the sex
difference, we can reduce about 23 percent of the errors in predict¬
ing the rankings in the perception towards work unity. Concerning
the percentage rate, the female respondents were less likely than
the male respondents to perceive work unity among employees in
the factory.
Table VI. 13 exhibits that there exists a positive and rather-
strong relationship between age level and perception of work unity
(G = + G.45-) in the sample. In other words, the higher the age
level, the higher would their evaluation towards work unity in the
factory.
Table VI. 1- signifies also a positive relationship between
work status and the perception towards work unity (G=+0.267), i.e.,
the higher the work status, the higher the evaluation towards work
unity.
As display in Table VI.13, there exists a positive relationship
between length of service and perception of work unity (G=+0.029).
H0wever, the relationship is very weak.
To put the above four tables together, it illustrated a pattern
that the male- respondents genera 11s showing a more positive attitude
towards work unity in the factory and at the same time, the rankings
in the background features like age, work status and length of service
of the sample are positively associated with the rankings in the
perception towards work unity.
At the same time, an organization with high employee cohesive-
ness is erceived as the one in which employees' work-mates are also
their friends, in which employees interact in leisure contexts outside
O
of work as wc11 as at work.
To further investigate into the off-work contact between
respondents and other employees in the factor, it shewed a picture-
that was quite differ ent from their in-work contact altera (see-
Table VI.16) . haturallo , it illustrated a general decline in the
intimacy of off-work from the in-work contact. The difference in
the frequency of association between the Chinese employees and with
the Japanese staff was still obvious but at the same time, the
rank difference also exerted influence in the off-work contact
among the respondents and the other Chinese staff.
Table VI.16 Off-work Contact with Seniors Fellow
Colleagues
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For respondents that considered as having some or very
frequent off-work association with their fellow colleagues, there
still maintained a 85-3% of the total whilst those with Chinese
seniors dropped to a figure of less than kO0 as compared with the
in-work contact of 89-. 1 °m There saw a even fewer off-work commun¬
ication between the respondents and their Japanese seniors. Over
93°r of the respondents considered themselves as having none or few
contact with the Japanese seniors outside the work setting. Indeed
the sparseness in association betwc.cn the sample and their Japanese
seniors can be accounted by the fact that not only Japanese staff is
on a higher work status, the language problem may also act as im
impediei.it for further association between the two. As raised by some
Chinese employees of the factory, 'The Japanese staff are pleasant
but we just feel uneasy in talking with them in English as both of
3
us are not so good at that.'
Undoubtedly, the frequently of contact between employees may
reflect a magnitude of the association but not necessary the intensity
of such. Table VI. 13 detects fu.rtl.ier the employee cohesiveness of
Factory Y by looking onto whether the respondents also possessing
intimate relationship with his work-mates.

















As shown in Table VI.17, over Gl0: of the sample conceived
themselves as having some or many good friends who are also their
present work-mates. For those considered themselves as having no
good friends at all inside the work setting, it accounted for 11.6
of the respondents.
The sample was further asked whether they could sense a
familial atmosphere in their work setting. As indicated in Table VI.18,
of the respondents gave a positive response towards this while
the remaining G0 admitted as having no such feeling at all.











Note: Two respondents failed to answer this item.
Generally speaking, the sample displayed a better in-work
as well as off-work contact with the Chinese employees than with
the Japanese staff. There saw quite a greater intimacy between
the respondents and their work-mates in the same rank in the work
setting and this relationship goes also beyond a simply work-relating;
one. Many of them maintained a high off-work contacts with their
work-mates and acquired some good friends in the process.
n r m n v T ri v n 1 v p rn P n t
Factory Y attempts to integrate their members not only by
coordinating their work activities arid distributing-; rewards, but ati c. J 1
the same time encouraging; the employees to participate into the
company wide or department based activities.
As postulated in Table VI.19, 7k. 8°' of the sample reported as
having very frequent or some participation in the recreational act¬
ivities organised by the factory with a fewer portion of them (25-3?0
considered then.selves as seldomly or never joining such kind ofo 1—'
ac tivities.


















Participation in company recreational activities is only
one aspect of employees' involvement in the company, they may
alsc identify with the company's more instrumental goal as to
improve the work techniques by raising concrete proposals or
suggestions to the management.
Respondents were asked if they would raise work suggestions
and comments to their seniors deliberately when they had came across
any. The majority of the sample (65-2%) admitted that they would
do so while the remaining 39. ?•% preferred to keep that to their
ownselves. (see Table VI.20)













Note: Three respondents failed to answer this item.
Emrlovees' Commitment towards the Organization
The top management of Factory Y has long been putting much
effort in stabilizing its work force. The commitment of employees
towards the company could be reflected by the propensity of turn¬
over as whether they planned to leave their present employment or not.
Naturally, a more committed employee would tend to show his loyaltyr
to the management by retaining himself in the organization.
Undoubtedly, occupational expectation may determine to a
significant degree of the orientation of the individual towardsw c '
hisher present job. Thus, what the individual aspires to achieve
rnav in turn influence the degree of pen nine; c y and co mi taunt hea O -L 0
may attach to his current employment.
A bulk of former studies (Ward, '1972; Carr,1973; Salaff, 1976;
Ting-Chau Ng, 1978) onto the industrial organizations and its
working population in Hong Kong further asserted the decisive role
of pecuniary reward in determining job attitude among local workers.
Table VI. 21 summarised the aspiration towards an ideal work
as perceived by the respondents in the study.
Table VI.21 Aspiration towards an Ideal Work
(in preference counts)





















Mote: 1. Each item can get a maximum of 93 counts
for there are 93 respondents in the sample
2. Total counts do not corresponse to the
total number of respondents for each can
choose a maximum of three items.
As shown in Table VI.21, monetary incentive still led.
But there also saw items like 'good colleague relationship';
'fair bossseniors'; and 'good promotion prospect' were highly
cherished by the respondents in the study in considering an ideal
job. There came also the relatively less significant items as
'good working environment'; 'good welfare benefits' as well as
'good job nature' , 'secure job' and 'good Staff Composition'.
On the other hand, one's subjective evaluation towards his
present work situation might also help to account for the indiv¬
idual's commitment and loyalty towards their current employment.
Generally speaking, those having higher degree of satisfaction
towards their current employment would tend to show their loyalty
to the organization by retaining behind.
To test whether a desirable and happy work setting could be
sensed by the employees, questions were then postulated to detect
the respondents' attitude towards their present employment in
Factory Y. As displayed in Table VI.21, the employees' relation¬
ship inside Factory Y had been highly praised by the sample as no
respondent felt any dissatisfaction towards it. The respondents
also showed generally a more favourable attitudes in relation
to items like 'employees' composition 1working environment';
'relationship with seniors' and 'job security stability' that
found in their present employment. At the same time, the sample
expressed a less favourable attitude towards such items as 'job-
training' ; 'chances for salary raise'; 'promotion prospect', and
«
to some extent the 'salary' that were offered by their present
employment.
Table VI.22 State of Satisfaction towards Present Job
(in number of respondents)



































































































Rote: 10ne respondent failed to give comments on the items.
2 Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total.
Generally speaking, the sample showed a more favourable attitude
towards the staff relationships and the physical environment provided by
the factory. When coming across items like 'job training'or to the more
instrumental one like 1 salary' level, 'prospect for monetary and positional
promotion', the respondents tended to display a greater degree of dissatis¬
faction towards their present employment.
To get a more precise view on the respondents' feeling
towards their present employment, the sample were asked to evaluate
their state of satisfaction towards their current job as a whole.
13-7 of the sample indicating a high degree of satisfaction (for
those feeling satisfied or extremely satisfied) whilst 7'° giving
an adversed impression (dissatisfied or extremely dissatisfied)
towards their current employment (see Table VI.23)- However, the
difference between these two ratios (13»7° and respectively)
was not too marked as the bulk of the sample provided an in-between
(i.e. 'average') rating - 78-9-
Table VI.23 State of Satisfaction towards Present




















Background features like sex, age, work status and length
of service are then employed again to see their res ective asso¬
ciation with the degree of satisfaction towards their present
employment. Degree of overall satisfaction of the respondents
towards current job is classified into three categories. Answer
with 'dissatisfied' or 'extremely dissatisfied' are termed as
having low degree of satisfaction. For those responded to the
'average' item could be taken as reaching medium level of satisfaction
and those gave answers with 'satisfied' or 'extremely satisfied' would
be considered as highly satisfied with the present employment.
Table VI.2h Satisfaction towards Present Employment





































( n] (28) (57) (10)
Gamma = +0.52
Table VI.26 Satisfaction towards Present Employment


















Table VI.27 Satisfaction towards Present Employment























Table VI.23 shows a gamma coefficient of the correlation
between sex and satisfaction towards present employment equals to
-0.161. It indicated a mild trend of lower degree of satisfaction
towards present job among the female respondents when comparing
with the male.
Table VI.23 shows that the age level is positively and
strongly associated with the degree of satisfaction towards
current employment (G=+0.32), i.e., the higher the age, the greater
would be the satisfaction towards present job.
Table VI.26 indicates that there exists a ositive and mild
relationship between work status and satisfaction towards present
employment (G=+0.227). In other words, the respondents with lower
work status were less likely to be satisfied with their current
employment.
Table VI.27 also shows that the level of work length'is
positively and mildly associated with the satisfaction level
(G=+0.135), i.e., the longer the length of service in the company,
the higher would be the satisfaction level of the respondents.
The respondents were then asked to evaluate the management
of Factory Y and to rank it inielation to other work organizations
they had worked for or knew of. It was assumed that a poor comparative
rating would also reflected in a lesser commitment towards their
present employment. Table VI.28 therefore summarises these ratings
in qualitative term of 'the best', 'better than average, 'average',
'worse than average', or 'the worst'. The portion of the sample
showing a plus (i.e., 'better than average') was much higher than
those who gave a minus (i.e. 'worse than average') with no resp¬
ondents fell on the both extremes.




















Note: 0ne respondent failed to answer this item-L
To put Table VI.23 and Table VI.28 together, the sample
showed a more in-between (i.e. for those choosing 'average')
attitude towards their present employment situation as a whole.
But when the managerial factor was singled out from such, the resp¬
ondents indicated a more favourable impression towards the management
of the factory.
Tables VI.291 30, 315 32 below show the association between
the respondents' sex, age, work status and length of service with
their degree of satisfaction towards the management of the factory.
The degree of satisfaction is again divided into three categories:
those answers with 'dissatisfied' or 'extremely dissatisfied' are
termed as having a lower level of satisfaction; those giving the
'average' answers are classified as having a medium degree of
satisfaction and those with 'satisfied' or 'extremely satisfied'answers
are grouped as highly satisfied towards the nanagemeub of the
company.




























































Table VI.32 Satisfaction towards Management by Length



















(n) (28) (98) (18)
Gamma = -0.019
Table VI.29 shows a gamma coefficient of the association
between sex and satisfaction towards management equals to -0.372
and infers a higher degree of satisfaction towards management as
among the male respondents when comparing with the female.
Table VI.30 indicates a positive and mild relationship
»
between age level and degree of satisfaction towards management
(G=+0.196). In other words, the older the age, the higher the
satisfaction level towards management.
Table VI.31 shows that the level of work status is positively
and quite strongly associated with the satisfaction level towards
management in the sample (G=+0.311), i.e., the higher the level of
work status, the greater would be the satisfaction.
Table VI.32 finds that there exists an inverse relationship
between the length of service of the respondents and the satisfact¬
ion tovards management (G = -0.01f). However, such a relationship
is rather weak.
In summary, the male respondents tend to develop a more
favourable attitude tovards the management of the factory. At
the same time, those vith older or higher work status display also
a greater degree of satisfaction. Yet, the level of work length
is little related to the degree of satisfaction towards management.
To gauge the commitment of the employees tovards the firm
as reflected in their propensity of turnover, the respondents were
asked if they planned to leave their present employment in the
nearest future, (see Table VI.33)
Table VI.33 Thought of Leaving the Present Employment in
the Nearest Future
N %
Intend to Leave Present Job







Note: Seven respondents failed to answer this item.
Less than 37% of the respondents showed a readiness to be
on-the-move as against 637% who considered that they had no
intention of leaving their present work position in the nearest
f u t ur e.
To test again whether such basic attributes like sex, age,
work status, and length of service of the respondents may exert any
association on their propensity of turnover, Tables VI. 3, 35,
36, 37 summarise such findings. An answer with 'unintend to
leave the present job' is conceived as having a lower propensity
of turnover while those admitted as 'intend to leave the present
job' is taken as having a higher propensity of turnover.
Table VI.3 Propensity of Turnover by Sex
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Table VI.34 shows that the female respondents are generally
having a lower propensity of turnover than the male respondents
(G=-0.092). Yet such a difference between the male and female
respondents in the propensity of turnover is rather weak.
Table VI.35 indicates that the age level is inversely anden «
rather strongly associated with the propensity of turnover
(G=-0.318) , i.e., the older the age, the lover would be the
propensity of turnover.
Table VI.36 displays that there exists an inverse relation¬
ship between work status and propensity of turnover (G=-0.077).
In other words, respondents with higher work status were more
likely to have a lower propensity of leaving their present
employment. However, such relationship is very weak.
Table VI.37 postulates that the level of the length of service
is inversely associated with the propensity of turnover (G=-0.273)-
It implies a view that respondents with longer length of service
in the factory would more likely to possess a lower propensity of
turnover.
In a nutshell, respondents with an older age or longer
length of service would be more inclined to show a lesser propensity
I o 0
of leaving the present employment while as the aiitshin sex and
work status saw a rather weak association with the rankings of the
propensity of turnover.
The respondents were then asked to cited their reasons for
leaving or staying behind. Among those who were 'on-the-move1
(see Table VI.38) that had written down reasons of so, 28.60 cited
'want to have change' and the other 28. 6°$ considered 'seek for a
better job' as a reason for thinking so - the two most common
factors hence identified. 'Insufficient salary' as a reason of
planning to leave accounted for less than 13 among the on-!,overs.
Also identified as causes behind their intention of leaving were
the less significant ones as 'poor management' (7-1°); 'too heavy
work load' (7-1) or 'to further study' (7-1)- Yet, the pervasive¬
ness of these latter factors was less marked than tin t of the fore¬
going three factors.
Table VI.38 Reasons for Planning to Move Out of
Present Job
Reasons for Leaving N
Vant to have Change
Seek for a Better Job
Insufficient Salary
Poor Management




















Rote: Four respondents failed to write down their
reasors for planning to leave.
Indeed, it seemed that the respondents' intention of
leaving their present job to a great extent sprang from the
unvarying nature of the vork itself and at the same time the relative
low occupational prestige of such kind of simple production work
(i.e., they want to change and to seek for other better jobs).
»
Insufficiency of their present earning or unfavourable attitude
towards the present management of the facte, ry accounted far less
for tbeir reasons of quitting.
On the other hand, Table VI.39 enumerates the reasons
provided by the respondents for planning to stay at their present
employment. Half of those planning to stay (50%) •ositively expressed
satisfaction with their present job as a whole, with another 17.1%
pinpointing to the satisfaction towards the staff relationship in
particular. For a no the. r group of respondents (13-1% oh the samale).
they did not contemplate of leaving simply because they could not
find better alternations for the time being - seemingly suggestive
of a weak commitment to the present employment of the factory.
Table VI.39 Reasons for Planning to Stay at Present Job
Reasons for Staying N
Satisfied with the Present Job
Satisfied Staff Relationship
Can't Find Better Job
Good Working Schedule















Note: Ten respondents who thought of staying behind
failed to tell the reasons.
To further investigate into the loyalty of the production
operatives towards Factory Y, the monetary factor was so singled
out to test the respondents' propensity of turnover. The respondents
were asked as whether they would consider leaving their present
employment if there exist another job offering 57 more in their
salary.
As shown in Table VI. +0, there still maintained a portion
of well over 60% of respondents claiming commitment to the present
employment.
Table VI. -0 Thought of Leaving the Present Job if
Another One Offering a 5° Raise in Salary
Note: Nine respondents failed to answer this question.
In spite of this lure of a possible 5% more increase in salary
provided by another new job, there saw no obvious increase in the
on-movers' category.
Will Leave the Present Job










All in all, the study on the employees' feedback towards
their present employment merely intended to provide an-other
alternative in seeing whether such company ideals as to offer a
desirable and happy work setting as well as to promote a harmonious
and integrated work-relationsbip were attained iri the way that
these could be objectively sensed by the employees of the factory.
From the study, the employees' integration towards the company
can be taken as a satisfactory one. A great portion of the production
operatives in the sample showed a rather favourable attitude towards
their present work situation and to the management of the factory in
particular- The greatest discontentment of the respondents seemed
to spring from the repetitive job nature and their position as
production workers that occupied a less prestige occupational status
that initiated their volatility in searching for more promotional
chances and much better job advancement.
When the background features of the respondents like sex,
%
age, work status and length of service were isolated to test their
respective association with cert;in attitudinal items as their
preception of work unity, degree of satisfaction towards present
employment, as well as towards management, and their commitment
to the company as reflected in their intention of staying behind,
it displayed a picture tint the female respondents were generally
more likely to show a less favourable view towards such when
comparing with the male respondents. On the other hand, ranking
in age, work status and length of service of the sample shows a
positive relationship with the above mentioned attitudinal items.
In other words, for those respondents with older age level, or
higher states, or longer length of service, they were more likely
to hold a stronger sense of work unity; or to show a higher degree
of satisfaction towards current employment or management; or to
indicate a greater intention of remaining in the factory.
Undoubtedly, any further comments on the merits and shortcomings
of the organization as based on the employees' feedb ck in the survey
surely meets difficulty since we are lacking of any other compatible
studies that could compare and contrast with the findings in this
preliminary study. In facing with time constraints, the study is
necessarily superficial and unsophisticated in mature. As I.he
investigation, on the management patterns and practices of Factory 1
as well as the employees' feedback towards their current employment
were proceeded at the same time, there might fall short of a well
linkage between t.he two. Moreover, the present study on the
employees' feedb .ck also owes the limit; tion of confining the
analyses solely among those lower gr de production operatives
(i.e., the junior technicians and common workers) with those atti¬
tudes of the Chinese and Japanese employees in the middle and upper
management remains basically untouched. Indeed, the junior technicians
in the study did tend to show a higher degree of commitment towards
the organization. Thus, ti.ose employees with higher .ork status may
possibly display an . titudinal pattern- tow .re's present employment
that is quite different from the lower grade production operatives.
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However, to conclude that the management of Factory Y has
been achieving a notable success throughout operational years is
hardly an exaggeration. The organization of the factory maintained
a gradual expansion with steady growth in sales volume and in profit
returns. Moreover, there saw also a satisfactory level of employees'
commitment towards the organization as reflected in a high work
attendance (inspite they were monthly paid), an increase in product-
ivity as well as in experiencing a relatively lower rate of labor
turnover if we compare it to the most of the outside figures.
153
Footnotes:( Chapter VI)
1. Y.N. Yin as quoted in Theodora Ting-Chau & S.H. Ng, The Socio-
Psychological Factors of Labor Turnover in Hon Kong, Unpublished
manuscript, 1978, p.2.
2. Robert M. Marsh and Hiroshi Mannari, Mordernization and the
Japanese Factory, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University PreE-s,
1976, p.10.
3. Such remarks were gathered during causal converEation with the
Chinese employees of the factory dura rig attending the factory's
'spring feast' in early February, 1982.
CHAPTER VII DISCUSSION CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters attempted to investigate into the
Japanese management style by taking an initial examination on how
a Japanese subsidiary factory, Factory Y, worked in Hong Kong.%
The formal structure of the factory was studied; its management
pattern and practices were explored; and, the general performance
of the organization as well as the feedback from the production,
operatives were detected.
Factory Y, similar to many Japanese subsidiary firms in
Hong Kong, was staffed by a small group of Japanese managers with
1
the rest of employees the local people. The operation of Factory Y
enjoyed a great autonomy from the Japan parent company in which
the management and production strategies were determined to an
overwhelming extent by the top management of the factory.
In Factory Y, a particular management philosophy that origi¬
nated within the parent company in Japan is also being actively
%
disseminated in the Hong Kong work setting. The philosophy,
though implicit in nature, presents a clear picture of the organi¬
zation's objectives - and thus help to transform commitment into
production effort. The distinct favour of Factory Y's company
ideal covers not only the interest of the employer, but also a
well balanced concern over its employees, the customers, and the
public at large. Its uniqueness saw a dec-p concern with the em¬
ployees' worklives, as the business finn is conceived as a field
in which both the management and employees cooperate nith each
other to make all people concerned satisfy their business. The
ideal is thus to reconcile the objective of the pursuit of profit
and perpetuation of the company as a group.
Such an implicit organizational philosophy of Factory Y,
indeed, provides guidance for managers by presenting a basic
theory of how the firm should, be managed. In the process of
doing so, the additional Hong Kong environment (i.e., the economic
atmosphere, the structure of labor market, and the like) may
influence the kind of strategies employ or which of the practices
will require more attention from the top management. As raised
by Ouchi (1981:41), the implicit nature of management philosophy
in the Japanese firm holds the merit in providing more flexible
managerial practices since an almost limitless number of specific
rules or targets can be deduced from such general statements of
philosophy to suit the changing conditions.
The management; objectives of Factory Y stressed a long-
term view in planning; it sets a greater value on the future of
theorganization than on the immediate result at the present
i
moment. Undoubtedly, this seemed to be one of the main reasons
that made the Japanese spliting from their Chinese partner to
run the factory solely by themselves.U U
To achieve the management ideal of providin high qualityO _L ' O 1 J
products with reasonable price to the customers, there saw a
continuous effort to improve the quality of goods and to keep the
production cost as low as possible. In this aspect, an active
concern in applying a high level of technology in production,
a strict quality supervision, and the ' Y Production System' (YSS)
served as important management tools.
Indeed, human resources is considered as the main concern
of the management of Factory Y. To mention the observations of
Pascale and Athos (1981:26), today's world competition poses an
organizational challenge that cannot be met simply by technology
or financial resources. Rather, technological innovations and
t
resources allocation are outcome of human processes. The Japan¬
ese industrialists, are thought of possessing quite a distinctive
way to organise human resources (Vogel, 1979; Ouchi, 1981; Pascale
and Athos, 1981) in such a way that those desirable outcomes as
increasing productivity and employees' commitment towards the
organization are generated.
To the president of Factory Y, the extent that production
can efficiently and effectively carry out greatly depends on the
integrating effort between each and every employee in the organ¬
ization by working and contributing themselves to the company as
a harmonious whole. At the same time, this management orientation
seemed to back up by a well integrated system of strategies and
techniques that translate this abstract' principle into reality.
Thus, these management practices in Factory Y as they affect the
key company asset of human resources worth particular mentioning
in this report. In the process of doing so, the analytical
model as proposed by Hatvany and Pucik (1p8l:9) on the basis of
an intensive study of the personnel management practices among
the Japanese subsidiary settings in the U.S. were occassionally
referred to (the model is displayed in Chapter II of this essay).
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Needless to say, the benefits of an articulated management
philosophy are lost, however, if it is not properly communicated
to employees or if it is not visibly supported by management's
behavior. To the top management of Factory Y, in return for an
employee's effort, the commitment to the employee is translated
into company's determination to avoid layoffs and to provide a
wide range of supplementary welfare benefits for the employees.
Naturally, without reasonable employment security, the fostering
of employee's morale and cooperation would not be possible.
Undoubtedly, the lifetime employment as practised among
many large Japanese enterprises in Japan is commonly conceived
as the rubric under vhich many facets of Japanese life and work
are intograted.2 Nevertheles,, scholars like Ilatvany Pucik
(1981:10), and Ouchi (1981:23) also pointed out that such a kind
of lifetime employment practice is still not universal in Japan
and is possible only as a consequence of a unique social and
economic structure that is not so easily replicated elsewhere.
Given a relatively stable labor market and. an underlying consensus
between the employers and the employees, the employees of large
firms in Japan have difficulty in finding,, jobs of the same
quality else-where.
In the case of Honk Kong, the labor market i, characterised
by a highly volatile nature. As raised by England Pear (1981:48),
the historical conditions of exppandinr demand for unskilled workers
and machine operatives in Hong Konr encourage workers to believe
that by moving to another firm is a necessary and desirable way
to get more money. In this way, for those wokers whose skills
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are general rather than enterprise specific, it was the labor
market external to the company which provided them with greater
security and rewards.
To the Japanese president of Factory Y, it is well under-
stood, that a life-long committed work force cannot be easily attained
under the work setting in Hong Kong. Thus, instead of practising
lifetime employment, the management guarantees its work force a
relatively secure employment. The Japanese managers believe that
job security has a positive impact on morale and productivity,
limits turnover and training costs, and increases the organizat-
ion's cohesiveness. Long-term employment security is provided to
the employees. All the employees of the factory are considered
as permanent staff and they are monthly paid. Hiring from out-
side into the upper-level position is rare, if not totally absent.
Layoffs and terminations occur rather rarely. Moreover, dismiss-
al is now little affected by personal likes and dislikes of the
superiors. Employees would not be discharged from their post any-
thing less than very serious misconducts and there comes formal
warnings to ensure an understanding between the two parties before
any further action proce ds. When facing a less favourable eco-
nomic circumstance, a freeze of new hiring to replace those
voluntarily leaving their post is the main tactic employed by
the top management rather than to discharge part of its work force.
Throughout the operational years of Factors Y saw such a
kind of long-term employment security worked well. Undoubtedly,
a sound financial background (as haying a well-established parent
company in Japan) and a relatively stable product market (as the
production of precision goods like optical products) surely helped
a great deal to keep such a kind of employment security to the
employees a possible. Nevertheless, the assumptions about the
positive impact of job security to the local labor force await
further qualification.
In addition, to tackle with the problem of high labor
turnover especially among the semi-skilled and unskilled operatives
in Hong Kong, techniques have been employed to counter-balance
this. The management of Factory Y allocates substantial financial re¬
sources to poy for the benefits (i.e., in various kinds of subsid¬
ies and allowances, to provide a more comfortable work setting, and
the like) for all employees. Such company benefits, however, may
not be so extensive as in Japan for a sense that the Hong Kong
-L . J O
employees prefer pecuniary rewards rather than 'golden handcuff
of benefits. Thus, monetary incentives are especially noteworthy
in items especially among those provided to the lower grade staff
that higher turnover has been record edThe periodical adjustment
of salary and the long service allowance are among such techniques
so manipulated no stabilize the local work force.
Besides offering moo pecuniary at l;rn o I; ions to t h o employ • o s ,
the management of Factory Y had to si modi fy part o r their product-O «. _L » J. J
ion techno log' in the production lines f o then were unable tono t .L »_
recruit qualified workers versatile enough to meet their needs and
also there did not see enough time to train thorn internally. To a
certain extent, however, such a kind of simplified work process
may further add a sense of boredom or job impotence to the
already repetitive and routine work nature as experienced by the
production operatives that demanding for change. The cycle per¬
petuates itself.
As illustrated from the study on ninety-five production
operatives of Factory Y in the preceding section, approaching half
of such lower grade operatives (b-2.1% of the sample) expressed a dis¬
satisfactory attitude towards the job training aspect as provided
by the present employment, which is by far the highest negative
rating recorded as compared with other attitudinal items towards
current job. Among those respondents who thought of leaving
their present employment in the near future, 'want to have change'
or to 'seek for a better job' are by far the most important factors
accounting for such an intention. Thus, it seems to postulate
quite a challenge to the top management of Factory Y if it wishes
to further bettering the workers' commitment to the company.
On the other hand, close attention has been given to integrate
%
employees into the organizatLon.X fj
From the study on the Japanese subsidiaries in U.S.,
Hatvany 1 Pucik (19 1:12) found that those subsidiaries paid great
emphasis on recruiting virgin workforce. The U.S. Japanese sub¬
sidiaries also adopted a slow promotion (as ehey all possessed a
seniority promotion system) and job-rotation training practice
to create an environment in which an employee became a generalist
rather than a specialist in one functional area and increasingly
socialized into the organization.
Indeed, no matter what it may be, much efforts, persever¬
ance, time and expenses are required for the management in order
to make multi-purpose staff by means of pure cultivation in the
individual organization. In an economic environment that business
competes for almost anything as in Hong Kong, the practicability
of such a kind of effort is much in doubt. As commented by one
Chinese industrialist that ran a large textile factory in Hong Kong,
' Can we afford to train a multi-purpose staff just to let himher
working for others finally? We must keep alert to our competitors
who are on their readiness to take over our best quality staff at
any time and in any price.'
In Factory Y at present, there saw no structured managerial
practices as non-specialized career path or job-rotation training
providing to the employees. The essence of organization ideal and
job training were so spread to the local employees during daily
work process or in any informal occassious (i.e. recreational
activities, informal staff meetings, and so on) where possible.
Yet, additional technical and administration know-how would be
gi ve 11 t o those eiiq)n.oy ees w L111 ou t stand i 11 g pe r f orrnancc a 11 d good
personality, and most of all, to those possessing high potentiality
rather than merely counting on their seniority as to retain and to
further integrate the so cherished staff.
Under the new re-organization orogramme that took olace in
the factory since March this year, there saw a further effort in
retaining the qualified local employees by expanding their promotion
chances to the top management. At the same time, the Japanese kind
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of non-promotional job-rotation training is thought of introducing
to those employees that are much expected or will enter in a
management training position in the very near future in spite of
the effort and burden the company may have to bear. However, the
outcome and impact of such is still too soon to make any further
comment but it should pave an interesting topic of investigation
in the future.
Integrating effort, in Factory 1, is also reflected by an
obvious stress on group effort in the work setting. The group,
rather than the individual, forms the basic work unit for all pra-
tical purpose. The utmost ideal of the company saw an effort to '
coordinate and to keep such basic units in a well-balanced level
and be eventually harmonized into one.
Undoubtedly, when talking about decision making process in
Japanese organizations, the image of a decision making by 'group
participation and consensus', 'bottom-top' initiations, or the
'ringi' system that denotes a long term planning procedure in get-
k
ting an unanimous approval, are commonly mentioned. In some cases,
the Japanese bosses were even described as figure-heads that gave
no actual orders in which they acted only as facilitator to aid
decision making rather than an actual decision making. v
To Hatvany and Pucik (191:16), such entrenchment of Japanese
decision making process required further elaboration. In facing-
changing business environment and especially when time is short,
decisions are in fact commonly made bv the too management in charge.O O — ' (
At the same time, the Japanese kind of d cision making should not
be identified with the participation in the western sense of word,
which encompasses negotiation and bargaining between a manager and
subordinates. Rather, in the Japanese context, negotiation are
primarily lateral between departments concerned with the decision.
The power of decision making in Factory Y concentrated in
the co-effort of the top management staff which were mainly domi¬
nated by the Japanese managers. The president of the factory got
actually a very decisive role in initiating many of the management
programmes. The president, having a long and extensive experience
in managing the factory (since 1970 when the Japanese got the sole
ownership of the factory) as to compare with the other Japanese
expatriates that usually stay for a period of three to five years,
is naturally more familiar with each and every aspect of the
o rganiza tion.
Under the current reorganization programme, there saw also
a growing trend of local involvement in the effort of decision
making as more Chinese staff were promoted to the top management
i
level. Indeed, such a growing interaction between the Chinese and
Japanese staff in the top management level as to decide the import¬
ant issues of tie factory should provide another stimulating study
in the future.
In Factory Y, group autonomy is encouraged as to solve the
operational problems on the spot as far as possible. There saw a
balanced ratio of skilled and unskilled workers in each basic
work unit so that the inexperienced ones could be sufficiently-i-
trained from within. Nevertheless, work gross autonomy in most
cases are bounded by clearly defined limit, with the too manage-
merit carefully coordinating team activities by controlling the
evaluation of members, the design of working techniques, the size
of the team, and the scope and amount of production. Yet within
this limit, teamwork is not only part of the company's articulated
philosophy, it actually forms the fabric of the work process. The
%
production operatives in the study illustrated a general trend
among those with older age, or with higher working status, or- with
longer work length in the factory would tend to show a higher per¬
ception of work unity in the work setting.
At the same time, a sense of we-feeling among employees is
strive! to attain in the work setting. Putting on working suit
may be nothing so special for the line operatives in the product¬
ion lines. Yet to the extent that each and every employee (from
the top management and the clerical staff in the air-conditioned
office to the common workers in the production and assembly lines)
need to wear uniform may be something quite fascinating.
Concern for employees as to promote further integration
anions work force is realised through a keen awareness towards thev ) v. J
employees' need and problems by the top and middle management. The
abolishment of the wear-a-hut practice among line worker;; in the
factory some years ago could be one of such illustration. Further¬
more, from the respondents in the study, a great majority of them
(85% of the sample) admitted a feeling of their seniors are awared
of their work problems.
Open communication between employees of different ranks is
encouraged and inherent in the factory's physical setting. As
reflected from the production operatives in the study, face-to-face
contact between themselves and their workmates was rather common.
Also, such a kind of communication pattern did not limit to only
the work setting, it is further extended to cover the off-work
interaction as well. Various company sponsored and departmental
based activities further deepen the involvement in employees' lives.
The participation in such social affairs is voluntary, but most of
the employees join.
Nakane (1970) outraises the importance of vertical relation¬
ship among the Japanese groupings. Yet the study of Factory Y shows
that communication as expressed in vertical exchnage between the
production operatives and their Japanese and Chinese seniors was much
less frequent. The operatives in the study illustrated a general
picture of more.intimate relationships between the employees of
comparable level rather than having emotional attachment with their
superiors. The spareness in contact with the Japanese expatriates
can to some extent be accounted by the fact of language barrier
between the two parties. From a couple of 'visits to the factory and
from participation in the company organized recreational activities,
it is noticed that the Chinese employees generally lack a confidence
in communicating writh their Jay nese seniors in a foreign language.
Yet, such a relatively lesser emotional attachment also existed among
the Chinese employees in different rankings may lead one to think
about one fundamental qusstion as whether the Chinese people in
Hong Kong are indeed possessing a different idea tov;ards group formation
that are not in line with the Japanese one.
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In summary, the case of Factory Y illustrated a management
orientation and practices based on the understanding that in return
for the employees' contribution to company growth and well-being,
the profitable firm should provide a stable and secure work environ-
merit as well as to protect the employees' welfare even during eco-
nomic slowdown.
Factory Y, though operated in an alien culture as in Hong Kong,
did attain quite a remarkable success. The organization throughout
the operational years saw an expansion in structure and in size,
a steady growth in sales volume and in profit a relatively low rates
of absenteeism and labor turnover and seemingly a satisfactory
commitment from the local employees working in the factory.
Indeed, the outstanding performance as achieved by Factory Y
in production and in sales can, to some extent, be accounted by the
management of the organization in maintaining a good vendor-vendee
relationship, in employing a high level of technology, and most of
all, in making continuous effort in improving the quality of goods
and in keeping the production cost reasonably low. At the same time,
the company's orientation to the quality of human asset, and the
techniques utilised by the management of Factory Y to integrate and
to motivate its Chinese employees- thus help to transform commit-
ment into production effort- seemed to play also an important part
to get such organizational success.
Let us avoid false expectation. We need not expect to
borrow entirely and directly from the Japanese. 6 Indeed, the present
outlook of the Japanese management model should not be considered as
a static one that remain unchanged. In fact, Dore (1973) and Ouchi (1981)
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clearly pointed out that such structural features as size did exert
influence on the' practice of the Japanese management practices.
Marsh and Mannari (1976) further seeeted the importance of the
environmental effects that helped to shape and alter the structure
and the features of the Japanese work corporations in immensing ways.
We are in such a way that our social and cultural heritages differ,
our economic and political systems variate from the Japanese.,
As illuminated from the study of Factory Y, it seems that the
Japanese kind of group orientation is perhaps much differs froii-i the
Chinese one. Under such limits, it is doubtful whether such
management practices as collective responsibility and collectiv':
decision making as found in the Japanese corporations in Japan
can equally applied under the Hong Kong environment. In the economic
aspect, the government's least intervcntion policy promotes a highly
competitive economic structure and an extremely volatile labor
market. Moreover, uncertainty towards Hong Kong's political future
also aids a life perspective of 'living for today' as among the
common people in Hong Kong. What concern people most would be the
concrete and immediate rewarc's they can possibly get. Under such a
situation, it is unlikely to expect the local employees to remain
in the organization for their entire work career, waiting patiently
for their chances of promotion and commited wholeheartedly to the
organization they belong to. Thus, in the case of Factory Y, life
employment practice to the employees i:, not. Er:iploye(3. At th sJrn e
time, the Japanese managers also need to accelerate (as reflected
in the reorganization progranime) the promotion cIar.ces to the Chinese
employees in exchange for their further commitment to the corr,ppa.ny.
Also, extrinsic renvards ar reflected in the pecuniary ones arQ stressed
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on the top of. those more intrinsic one as non-promotional job-
rotation training as practised among many work corporations in
Japan that served as means to integrate the employees into the firm.
Hence, it foresees a complete imitation of the Japanese
management practices as illustrated in the ideal-typical formulation
of the Japanese management model impractical or to some extent,
impossible, under the given environment of Hong Kong. As remarked
by the Japanese president of Factory Y, 'My management style is ao
simple, that is, to recognise fact and situation first, to see in
the future, to consider how to do, and to proceed it moderately and.
steadily. I paid much attention not to force to proceed Japanese style
which may be unapplicable or impractical in Hong Kong. However, I
have tried some Japanese ways after serious consideration, or I have
taken unconsciously certain Japanese ways, because I am a Japanese and
have much more experience in the Japanese industrial sector than that
in Hong Kong.'
Undoubtedly, the open economy of Hong Kong did provide a
battleground for business to operate but at the same time, it did
promote a favourable atmosphere for foreign venture to operate.7
The contribution of these foreign investors to Hong Kong may not
be just confined to the additional capital or employment opportunity
for the local work force they have brought along it may also be
their special management practices and technical skills they introduced.
In Hong Kong nowadays, the western principles of personnel management
and theories of organizational psychology have reached a widening
audience of local managers and supervisors.8 However, the Japanese
kind of personel management and organizational perspective seemed also
worth us paying more attention to. 9
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Needless to say, this initial study or. the managerial pattern and
practices of a Japanese subsidiary setting, Factory Y, in Hong Kong
is necessarily tentative in nature. Certainly, such a single case
study serves no way as to*postulate any general outlook as to cover
all the management features of the Japanese subsidiary firms in
Hong Kong. In addition, there exists no intention as to infer such
as immature view that the Japanese industrialists are superior to
the Chinese industrialists even in managing the local work force in
Hong Kong. Indeed, Hong Kong is notable for her successful economic
growth over the past decades that some commentators (Chen in Leth-
bridge, 1981:1 Woronoff, 1981:1) also conceived as a miracle. Mok
(in King and Lee, 1981:102) related such a successful industriali-
zation of Hong Kong to its active entrepreneurship in which the
Chinese entrepreneurs paved significant contributions in providing
unlimited supply of initiatives to promote economic growth.
Notwithstanding, whether these findings and conjectures
from the study of Factory Y can be substantiated or not depend much
upon the effort of further studies to cover more other Japanese
subsidiary organizations in Hong Kong. Parallel to this, the
effort in bringing out more thorough and up-dated investigations
as to cover more Chinese and other foreign economic organizations
in Hong Kong seems indispensable to provide a balanced view on the
really distinctiveness of these various kind of management practices.
In doing so, it should prove fruitful to the field of organizational
study and should generate greater significance to the local
management practitioners.
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APPENDIX I. SAMPLING PROCEDUREI
As in February 1st, 1982, there were altogether 677 employees
working in Factory vf with thirteen of them Japanese expatriates. The
ratio of male to female staff in the factory is roughly 6-0:60
(282 male, 395 female employees). A set of structured questionnaire
was so prepared that aimed at the feedback of the lower grade
Chinese production operatives (for those employees with junior
technician or common worker title accounted for 86.5% of the total
employees in the factory).
A initial idea of getting a feedback from 100 production
operatives was set. Ba.se d on the in- format ic n provided by the
factory office concerning the number of Chinese employees in each
section and the sex distribution of such, six departments (Parts
Centre; Assembling Quality Assurance; Optics Production; Machine
Shop; Metal Finishing; Packing Packaging) which represent a total
of.628 employees, or 93%o of the total in the factory) that were
directly involved in the conveying and production process were
singled out. The desired number of respondents from each department
was drawn in a ratio of approximately one respondent in every six
employees in the respective section, bearing in mind the total number
as well as the sex distrubution of such. Table A.1 displays the
total number of employees in these six departments and the figures
in parentheses represent, the desired respondents from each department.
Table A.1 Distribution of Chinese staff in the selected
six production departments of Factory Y and
the intended number of respondents from each









Source : Company Record of February, 1982.
No t e : Figures in -parentheses are the intended distribution of
of respondents from e tch production • i .
The intended distribution of respondents from each section
were drawn in a ratio of roughly 1:6 but sometimes the
figures were so adjusted and rounded up to aid a ratio












































The 100 questionnaires were then placed in separate envelops
and addressed to the respective department concerned. Instructions
as how these questionnaire should distribute (i.e., the required
number, the work status and the sex distribution of the respondents
in the respective department) were clearly printed on the cover of
each envelop. Together with ten more spare copies that the question-
naires were first brought to the president: of the factory in mid
February. Through the assistance of the Chinese supervisor in the
Factory Office that the questionnaires were distributed to the
department concerned.
The questionnaires were collected two weeks later from the
Chinese supervisor. Table A.2 shows the intended distribution of
respondents the dep.trt.ments and the actual returned distribution
of such. (See next page)
A total of ninety-eight responded copies were finally obtained
with two expected copies from the Assembling and Quality Assurance
Department failed to 6sttain. A preliminary investigation onto the
returned questionnaires furl her found that there were three more
iiivalid responses (oine from the Machine Shop and two from the Metal
Finishing) since the respondents left. the whale last page of the
questionnaire unfinished. Thus, the analysis is based or. these
ninety-five returned questionnaires so obtained finally.
Table A.2 Intended distribution of respondents in the




















































No t. e : Figures in parentheses are the •t'lnl outcome of the
distribution of respondents.
APPENDIX II. QUESTIONNAIRE
The responding items in the questionnaire are divided
into six parts. Part I clarifies some background features of
the respondents; part II proceeds to study the respondents'
t
aspiration towards an ideal job. Part III of the questionnaire
investigates the past work experience of the respondents. Parts
IV, V, and VI aim at the respondents' present work situation
as reflected in their relationships with other employees in
the factory and in their attitudes and the degree of satisfaction
towards current employment.
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